Organizational power and distributional conflict within OECD nations

Abstract. This article claims that a predator-prey model of cyclical growth is a useful concept for studying the dynamic relationship between wage and salary shares of GDP and employment. The rate of growth of employment is considered as an indicator of union bargaining strength; the change of the wage share is treated as a reflection of an ongoing distributional conflict between profits and wages. The paper discusses some of the analytic properties of the formal model. It continues with an attempt to fit the model to West German data for the period from 1960 to 1985. Given the formal rigidity of the model, this strategy is only partially successful. As a consequence, a more complex model is introduced which also relies heavily on the idea of a predator-prey cycle. As a fully-fledged political-economic model of the OECD type of systems, it allows us to study, among other issues, the implications of different union policies under the constraint of a serious unemployment problem.     

The frog pond beauty contest: Physical attractiveness and electoral success of the constituency candidates at the North Rhine-Westphalia state election of 2005

Abstract.  Voters usually do not know much about the biography and political agenda of the local candidates for parliament in their constituency. Since posters with photographs of these candidates are omnipresent on the streets during the election campaign, many voters are at least familiar with their facial appearance. As a consequence, the attractiveness of the constituency candidates substantially influences voter behaviour. This is shown by the example of the North Rhine-Westphalia state election of 2005. Judgments about the attractiveness of the constituency candidates were collected by means of a web survey among members of an online access panel. Respondents were confronted with portrait photographs of local candidates and asked to rate their attractiveness. According to the truth-of-consensus method, the attractiveness score of a candidate is computed by averaging across the different ratings he or she has received. Voter behaviour is captured by the real-life election results in the constituencies.     

‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction: Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010

When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence.     

The Politics of Constitution Making: Transforming Politics into Constitutions

According to our conventional perception of the interrelations between revolutions and constitutions, constitutions perpetuate the interests of the victorious forces of the revolution. This paper analyzes the distinctive character of the revolutions of 1989 in East and Central Europe with respect to their claim to constitutionalism. The main characteristic of these revolutions is the disbelief of their proponents in the postulate of a homogeneous unitary popular will which imposes itself on the society. Intead, two different concepts of civil society have been emerging, both of which can be connected with a more elaborate notion of constitutionalism. Constitutions can be understood as institutional devices which encourage the endurance of their legality without being entirely dependent on either the principle of self-interest or the idea of pre-political consensus.