Political Influences on Monetary Policy 1914–84

This study examines political, institutional and economic influences on monetary policy in the long run. A monetary policy reaction function is estimated, which focuses principally on the influence of the administration, Congress and the Federal Reserve on outcomes; these influences are estimated together with a variety of economic and political controls. The findings show that partisan control of the White House is particularly important in explaining variations in the growth of the quantity of money over time. Republican control of the White House is associated with tighter money, and Democratic control with looser money, but there are exceptions. Finally, the indirect influence of partisanship on the economic variables in the reaction function suggest that the total effects are stronger than the direct effects alone.     

Macroeconomic performance and government popularity in Britain: the short run dynamics

Abstract. Despite an extensive body of research on popularity function modelling there is little agreement about the magnitude and stability of effects. This is particularly true in the literature relating to Britain. The purpose of this paper is to specify and test a popularity function for Britain using the Box-Jenkins transfer function model building strategy. The model is estimated for the thirty-three year period between 1947 and 1980. This approach provides a particularly stringent test of causal links between the economy and political support. It demonstrates statistically significant links between unemployment, inflation and the devaluation of the currency, and the level of support for the incumbent party over the opposition party in the polls. However the links are not strong enough to provide an efficient forecasting model, and the effects are unstable over time. Generally the economic effects are related to the magnitude of unemployment and inflation.     

Predicting the Labour Vote in 1983: Social Backgrounds versus Subjective Evaluations

Labour's electoral performance in the 1983 General Election is examined in the light of a theoretical model of voting behaviour, originally developed to explain the 1979 election. In this model, voting behaviour is seen as a product of the individual's social attributes and his or her subjective evaluations of the Labour Party. The evidence indicates that subjective evaluations, particularly affective and retrospective evaluations, were far more important than social attributes in predicting the Labour vote in 1983. Moreover the latter were only weakly related to the former, which suggests that purely sociological accounts of electoral choice are becoming increasingly obsolescent in explaining and predicting electoral behaviour in Britain.