Brexit and Strand Three of the 1998 Agreement: The Three Faces of East-West

Under Strand Three of the 1998 Belfast ‘Good Friday’ Agreement, institutions were set up to promote the ‘harmonious and mutually beneficial development’ of the ‘totality of relationships’ between the peoples and governments of Ireland and the UK, including its devolved administrations and Crown Dependencies. According to the text of the 1998 Agreement this ‘east-west’ dimension was to have two elements with corresponding institutions: an intergovernmental one reflected in the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) and an interjurisdictional one reflected in the British-Irish Council (BIC). These Strand Three institutions were designed to provide fora for, respectively, intergovernmental cooperation on ‘non-devolved Northern Ireland matters’ in the case of the BIIC and information exchange and cooperation ‘on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations’ in the case of the BIC. Nowhere in the 1998 Agreement text is the concept of ‘east-west’ used to refer to relations between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Yet, in the wake of Brexit, and in the midst of controversy over the implications of the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, relations between Great Britain and Northern Ireland (GB–NI) have been newly framed as ‘east-west’. The creation of this new discursive face of ‘east-west’ relations marks an important, but little discussed, impact of Brexit on the political and constitutional landscape of the UK and Ireland. Against this backdrop, this article considers the impacts of Brexit, and the Protocol, on three faces of ‘east-west’ relations—the BIIC, the BIC and, newly, GB–NI—and discusses their implications for the future of Strand 3 institutions and the ‘totality of relationships’ they represent.     

Dynamic Pie: A Strategy for Modeling Trade‐Offs in Compositional Variables over Time

The substance of politics involves competition that evolves over time. While our theories about competition emphasize trade‐offs across multiple categories, most empirical models tend to oversimplify them by considering trade‐offs between one category and everything else. We propose a research strategy for testing theories about trade‐off relationships that shape dynamic compositional variables. This approach improves current methods used to analyze compositional dependent variables by addressing two limitations. First, although scholars have considered compositional dependent variables, they have done so in contexts that were not dynamic. Second, current approaches toward graphical presentations become unwieldy when the compositional dependent variable has more than three categories. We demonstrate the utility of our strategy to expand current theories of party support and political budgeting. In both cases, we can extend trade‐offs across pairs of alternatives (e.g., prime minister versus all other parties or spending on defense versus everything else) to competition across multiple alternatives.     

Who should be chef? The dynamics of valence evaluations across income groups during economic crises

In this paper, we investigate partisan rationalization in valence politics by trying to better specify the direct and indirect effects of the economy on government support. To do so, we examine how income levels moderate the influence of objective economic conditions on perceptions of which party is the best manager of the economy during a period of economic crisis, 2004–2010, in the United Kingdom. We find that low-income voters are more responsive in their assessments of the incumbent Labour government based on unemployment, as are high-income voters in terms of inflation. In addition, high-income voters tend to behave in a manner consistent with partisan rationalization, while low-income voters do not. These conclusions offer important implications for the effectiveness of electoral control of government policy, as well as the quality of representation.