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Joas Wagemakers 《Terrorism and Political Violence》2013,25(3):357-377
This article shows how Hamas legitimized its policy choices during the Al-Aqsa intifada and the Gaza war. The organization's policy moved from violent during the initial stages of the uprising to more moderate during later years. While this entailed huge changes in the organization's course of action, Hamas nevertheless always managed to frame its choices in a way that seemed consistent with its long-held beliefs. The same occurred during the Gaza war, when Hamas moderated its discourse even further. This shows Hamas' flexibility and pragmatism but also that seemingly rigid ideological views can change quite dramatically when circumstances change too. 相似文献
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Joas Wagemakers 《冲突和恐怖主义研究》2013,36(7):523-539
This article deals with the attempts by the radical Islamist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to reclaim scholarly authority over jihad, a phenomenon he has helped promote but that has led to excesses he disagrees with and has increasingly become the prerogative of fighters instead of scholars. These attempts by al-Maqdisi to reassert his own jihadi authority are expressed through criticism of certain jihadi practices and advice to jihad fighters. Because al-Maqdisi has been in the forefront of radical scholars calling for jihad, his criticism has been dismissed by some jihadis as revisionism of his earlier views and as the words of a man lacking any fighting experience himself. This article argues that al-Maqdisi's criticism of certain jihadi practices does not constitute revisionism of his earlier views but is an effort to take greater scholarly control of the jihadi trend that he has partly inspired but which—in the hands of militants—has also developed beyond what he sees as useful and even Islamically legitimate. 相似文献
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Hans Joas 《Berliner Journal für Soziologie》2002,12(4):505-515
In the last decade of his life, Talcott Parsons devoted a large part of his scholarly attention to the sociology of religion and to the history and symbolism of Christianity. This part of Parsons’s work has been almost completely neglected — both in the literature on Parsons and in the sociology of religion. In my interpretation, Parsons’s late systems-theoretical “human condition paradigm” is separated from his quasi-structuralist analyses of Jewish and Christian myths. The core of these myths is, according to Parsons, the idea of life as a gift. The article analyses the importance of this idea for (1) a sociological understanding of Christianity, (2) some aspects of contemporary moral theorizing, particularly the question how the Judeo-Christian tradition can be appropriated under the condition of highly developed autonomous individuality, and (3) the question of a latent Protestant bias in Parsons’s theory of social change. 相似文献
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Joas Wagemakers 《冲突和恐怖主义研究》2018,41(3):191-212
Over the last decade, a rift has emerged among Jihadi-salafis in Jordan between the “Zarqawiyyun”—who see Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi as their model and concentrate on combat—and the “Maqdisiyyun”—who want more scholarly guidance, emphasize the establishment of an Islamic State and follow Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The conflict in Syria, however, offered options for both: a jihad against a reviled regime and the possibility to set up an Islamic state. It thus had the potential to unite the “Zarqawiyyun” and the “Maqdisiyyun.” This article analyzes why this did not happen. 相似文献
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Joas Wagemakers 《British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies》2009,36(2):281-297
This article deals with the prominent contemporary Jihadi-Salafi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. In what follows, three major tenets of his ideology (al-walā? wa-l-barā?, kufr and jihad) are discussed. These concepts show that al-Maqdisi more or less transcends the boundaries of Quintan Wiktorowicz's division of Salafis into purists, politicos and jihadis. I contend that al-Maqdisi is relatively close to purist Salafism and can thus be seen as a ‘purist Jihadi-Salafi’. This implies that his ideas may resonate more easily with purists than the rhetoric of the likes of Osama bin Laden. At the same time, jihadis may take him more seriously because of his religious authority based on his close adherence to the purist creed. Although this article does not focus on explaining al-Maqdisi's popularity, it seems obvious that his specific combination of purist and jihadi Salafism may account for at least some of his standing among Salafis. 相似文献
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