Israeli State Violence during the Second Intifada: Combining New Institutionalist and Rational Choice Approaches

In attempting to explain Israel's retaliatory policies toward Palestinian violence, new institutionalist and rational choice theories vie for dominance. This article argues that both approaches can contribute to understanding the severity of Israel's response if they are viewed as nested explanations appropriate to different threat levels. The article makes its case using data from 74 interviews with senior Israeli counterterrorist experts (2006–07), counts of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities due to state and collective violence (1987–2007), and a database of collective violence events during the Second Intifada (2000–05). Institutional effects are evident at low threat levels, as new institutionalists predict, but these effects are overwhelmed at high threat levels, as rational choice theorists assert.     

Are Suicide Bombers Suicidal?

Recent work by Ariel Merari argues that, while certain contextual factors increase the probability of suicide attacks, they do not explain why particular individuals become suicide bombers. Merari seeks to demonstrate that suicide bombers are motivated by an unusually high prevalence of depression and suicidal tendencies. This article questions the representativeness of Merari's sample. It raises the possibility that interviewer and contextual effects contaminated his findings. Finally, it presents evidence that challenges Merari's conclusions. This evidence is drawn from interviews with immediate family members and close friends of a 25 percent random sample of Palestinian suicide bombers who conducted attacks between 2000 and 2005. Based on their analysis, the authors question the value of a psychological approach to the study of suicide bombers and assert the importance of focusing on the political and social roots of the phenomenon.     

Suicidality and Suicide Bombing Revisited: A Rejoinder to Merari

Ariel Merari purports to demonstrate a tendency on the part of suicide bombers to be motivated by depression and suicidal tendencies. However, he misconstrues the present authors' critique of his work and misinterprets their research. By clarifying both issues, this article seeks to substantiate three claims: (1) Merari's sampling procedure precludes generalization; (2) interviewer and contextual effects probably bias his findings; (3) evidence challenges his inferences.