Why are public offices sold in Kyrgyzstan?

Why are public offices for sale in Kyrgyzstan? To address this question, this article attempts to set out a new logic for understanding the motives, nature, and consequences of corruption in the country. Rather than securing access to a single favor through bribery, officials invest in political and administrative posts in order to obtain access to stream of rents associated with an office. Political and administrative corruption is organically linked in this system, and corruption stems not so much from weak monitoring as from being a franchise-like arrangement, where officials are required to pay continuous “fees” to their bosses. The key is to be the public official influencing the redistribution of rents as well as participating in the informal market where “public” goods are privatized and exchanged for informal payments. Thus, instead of control over the pure economic assets of the state, influence over the state's institutional and organizational framework is the dominant strategy for earning and investing in the country.     

The state under Siege: The drug trade and organised crime in Tajikistan

This article explores the impact of the drug trade on security and stability in Tajikistan. In order to capture the multifaceted nature of this relationship, the effects on territory, population, state institutions, and the idea of the state are examined. The types of threats affecting these components of the state are discussed. These include societal security in the form of addiction and drug-related diseases; the military threat, most notably manifested by the merger of crime and terror; economic and political threats resulting from a criminalised economic and political system; and the relationship between the drug trade and the legitimacy of the state.     

The State as Investment Market: A Framework for Interpreting the Post‐Soviet State in Eurasia

What type of state has emerged in post‐Soviet Eurasia, and what kind of theoretical framework can help us understand its behavior and performance? This article argues that we can usefully understand the logic of political and administrative organization in terms of a kind of “investment market.” Access to the state is frequently determined by actual financial payment. Would‐be officials invest in offices to obtain access to a stream of income associated with an office. This framework represents a novel perspective on the post‐Soviet state, which has hitherto either been premised on modernization theory or emphasized a robustly personalistic logic of political organization.