MANAGING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DIVERSITY FOR PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

Managers concerned with the performance of their organizations will exploit available social, administrative, and human capital resources. However, extant theory and mixed empirical evidence leave the effect of social capital on performance unclear. The gains from these norms of reciprocity, participation, networking, and trust may disproportionately benefit only some of their clients, leading to disparities in outcomes among diverse clienteles. We argue that in such contexts, management will put in place policies to counter these disparities. Indeed, our empirical evidence from the management of public education supports the expectation that an institutional commitment to diversity successfully mitigates the uneven effects of social capital on organizational performance. This finding carries important implications for public management and equity in public policy outcomes and may be of particular relevance to management of outcomes relying on co‐production.     

European parties' performance in electoral competition

Abstract: This article focuses on competition for votes between parties, as it existed in Western Europe in the period of the direct election to the European Parliament in 1989. Following earlier research by Van der Eijk and Niemöller, an instrument is introduced to measure the probability of party choice of EC citizens which establishes the likelihood of respondents to vote for any of the nationally relevant options/parties. A number of substantive conclusions about political parties'competitive performance result from this research. First, a single mechanism seems to structure electoral competition in all EC member-countries. Second, the competitive performance of political parties is not affected by their governmental status, their ideological position, and the degree of politicisation of the electoral environment. And third, parties'competitive performance is strongly affected by the degree of uniqueness of their electoral potential, their mobilising capacities, their ideological extremity and their sheer size.     

CRIME AS HAZARD: PERCEPTIONS OF RISK AND SERIOUSNESS*

The study of crime suffers from an inattention to the social consequences of criminal acts. Conceiving crimes within the larger context of “hazard,” data are reported on the relative seriousness of conventional and white-collar crimes, as well as other hazards, using a sample of Washington state respondents. The results indicate that there is an inverse relationship between the perceived likelihood of a hazard and its seriousness. Generally, the more immediate the threat of a hazard, such as white-collar crimes, the more serious it is perceived to be. There are also implications from these consequences for perceptions of institutional effectiveness and interpersonal relationships. This suggests that future studies of the consequences of criminality, especially white-collar and corporate violations, might be directed toward the notions of risk and, eventually, social trust.     

Public opinion towards welfare state reform: The role of political trust and government satisfaction

The traditional welfare state, which emerged as a response to industrialization, is not well equipped to address the challenges of today's post-industrial knowledge economies. Experts and policymakers have therefore called for welfare state readjustment towards a ‘social investment’ model (focusing on human skills and capabilities). Under what conditions are citizens willing to accept such future-oriented reforms? We point at the crucial but hitherto neglected role of citizens’ trust in and satisfaction with government. Trust and satisfaction matter because future-oriented reforms generate uncertainties, risks and costs, which trust and government satisfaction can attenuate. We offer micro-level causal evidence using experiments in a representative survey covering eight European countries and confirm these findings with European Social Survey data for 22 countries. We find that trust and government satisfaction increase reform support and moderate the effects of self-interest and ideological standpoints. These findings have crucial implications not least because they help explain why some countries manage – but others fail – to enact important reforms.     

STATE REGULATORY CAPACITY: EXPERIENCES FROM PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS IN NORWAY

State regulatory capacity is being threatened by internationalization, commercialization and persistent demand for public services. The article addresses the overarching question of how the state is changing due to recent public sector reforms. By studying changes in the regulation of the health care sector and the food sector in Norway, the article challenges the assumption that recent public sector reforms have necessarily led to a decline of the central state's regulatory strength. The conclusions are that the central state level has in fact been strengthened by regulatory reforms, by transferring authority to the state level and by enhancing the central administration's co‐ordinating and regulating capacity.     

ISSUE FRAMING AND SECTOR CHARACTER AS CRITICAL PARAMETERS FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING‐OUT IN THE UK

This article shows that variations in how two UK governments justified contracting‐out (issue framing), combined with shifting sector‐derived incentives for union activism (sector character), can help explain the extent of contracting‐out. Janitorial service, an activity of the UK government that should have been ‘low hanging fruit' for its prolific reformers, proved difficult to contract‐out for Thatcher's New Right Conservatives, but easier to contract‐out for Blair's New Labour. The New Right government framed contracting‐out narrowly, as merely an improvement in operational efficiency, and its reform faced unions that stood to lose a great deal from movement of janitorial jobs to private firms. In contrast, the New Labour government framed contracting‐out broadly, as a means to efficient social justice, and faced unions with low stakes in government janitors. As a consequence, UK government units could expect lower benefit and higher cost from contracting‐out janitors under Thatcher than they would under Blair.     

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY BODIES AND IMPOSSIBLE JOBS: THE FAILURE OF GERMAN PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING REGULATION

This case study takes the rise and fall of licence fee indexation within German public service regulation as an example and traces mechanisms of re‐politicization of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). According to the evidence, agency contestation is likely when: (1) administrative cultures result in incoherencies in institutional design; (2) IRAs deal with redistribution; (3) conflicts about principles of regulation persist; (4) IRAs pursue one particular regulatory ideology; (5) controversial regulatory output is highly visible; and (6) affected interests are not given a say. The article points to the relevance of new regulatory technologies that are likely to embody regulatory bias. Moreover, it seems that successful contestation of IRAs requires the conjunction of escalating factors. Nevertheless, such contestation might not result in a return to old modes of command and control.