The anatomy of autonomy: Reassessing the autonomy of the European Commission

Abstract.  The European Commission (Commission) occupies a pivotal role as the key executive institution of the European Union (EU). Yet, the factual autonomy of the Commission remains largely unexplored, contributing to contradictory assessments of it. This study reassesses the behavioural autonomy of the Commission, as well as organisational conditions thereof. The article utilises one under-researched laboratory of the Commission: temporary officials (SNEs). SNEs may serve as a crucial test-bed of Commission autonomy due to their ambiguous affiliation towards the Commission. Whereas past studies claim that SNEs have a predominantly intergovernmental behavioural pattern, this study demonstrates that the SNEs blend departmental, epistemic and supranational behavioural dynamics, thereby safeguarding their behavioural autonomy. Understanding Commission autonomy requires that the organisational anatomy of the Commission organisation be carefully considered. The organisational anatomy is measured by considering four independent variables: the organisational composition of the Commission services; organisational incompatibilities across levels of governance; recruitment procedures of Commission officials through a so-called 'submarine' approach; and socialisation dynamics inside the Commission. The autonomy of the Commission is organisationally contingent and not only subject to what has been called 'actors' conspicuous desire for autonomy'.     

WHY STRONG COORDINATION AT ONE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH STRONG COORDINATION ACROSS LEVELS (AND HOW TO LIVE WITH IT): THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union (EU) inherited ‘indirect administration’ from classical international organizations: policies adopted by the international organization are subsequently to be implemented nationally by member states themselves, and not by bodies owned by the international organization. This arrangement has often led to legislation being incorporated and applied rather differently across countries. In order to harmonize implementation practices within the EU, we have witnessed a development from ‘indirect administration’ to more ‘direct administration’ in the sense that national agencies work closely with the European Commission, EU agencies and sister agencies in other member states, partly bypassing national ministries. Thus, stronger coordination across levels may counteract strong coordination at the national level. This ‘coordination dilemma’ seems to have been largely ignored in the literatures on EU network governance and national ‘joined‐up government’, respectively. The ambition of this article is twofold: first, the coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Second, the article discusses organizational arrangements that may enable systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice.     

Political Leadership and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Effects of Agencification

Previous studies have shown that agencification tends to reduce political control within a government portfolio. However, doubts have been raised as regards to the robustness of these findings. In this article we document that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding holds when we control for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas, and officials' rank. Simultaneously we observe that the three control variables all have an independent effect on officials' attentiveness to a steer from above. In addition we find that the more organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. We apply large-N questionnaire data at three points in time, spanning two decades and shifting administrative doctrines.     

The Compound Machinery of Government: The Case of Seconded Officials in the European Commission

This article explores the compound machinery of government. Attention is directed toward decision making within the core executive of the European Union—the European Commission. The article studies seconded national civil servants (SNEs) hired on short‐term contracts. The analysis benefits from an original and rich body of surveys and interview data derived from current and former SNEs. The decision‐making dynamics of SNEs are shown to contain a compound mix of departmental, epistemic, and supranational dynamics. This study clearly demonstrates that the socializing power of the Commission is conditional and only partly sustained when SNEs exit the Commission. Any long‐lasting effect of socialization within European Union's executive machinery of government is largely absent. The compound decision‐making dynamics of SNEs are explained by (1) the organizational affiliations of SNEs, (2) the formal organization of the Commission apparatus, and (3) only partly by processes of resocialization of SNEs within the Commission.     

BUILDING FOREIGN AFFAIRS CAPACITY IN THE EU: THE RECRUITMENT OF MEMBER STATE OFFICIALS TO THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS)

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced common action capacities in the EU's external relations administration, notably the European External Action Service (EEAS). One essential capacity is staff resources. This article analyses to what extent and under what conditions the practice of staff recruitment to the EEAS is independent of government influence, and in particular the recruitment of officials temporarily assigned from EU member states. The data draw on interviews with officials from all 27 member states as well as the EEAS which is charged with the selection of national public servants to the EEAS. Key findings suggest substantial independence of recruitment to the EEAS, and this independence is facilitated under two particular conditions: (i) the supply of administrative capacities at EU level strengthens the capacity of the EEAS to nurture the independent recruitment of its personnel; and (ii) the recruitment of EEAS personnel is conditioned by pre‐existing organizational traditions, practices, and formats.     

NATIONAL AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE: GOVERNMENT DRIVEN,COMMISSION DRIVEN OR NETWORKED?

In terms of national agencies in the European administrative space, case studies indicate that national governments may be partly split so that national (regulatory) agencies operate in a ‘double‐hatted’ manner when practising EU legislation, serving both ministerial departments and the European Commission. Applying large‐N questionnaire data, this article follows up these studies by investigating how important various institutions are with respect to influencing national agencies when they are practising EU legislation. How discretion is exercised at this stage of the policy process is not trivial; we demonstrate that, in addition, this activity is highly contested. Our main conclusion is that implementation of EU policies at the national level is neither solely indirect via national governments (as the standard portrayal says), nor solely direct (through Commission‐driven national agencies), nor solely networked (through transnational agency clusters). Implementation is instead compound with several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously.