Normative and Civilisational Regionalisms: The EU,Russia and their Common Neighbourhoods

The contours of regionalism in a wider Europe are shaped by two dominant actors, the European Union (EU) and Russia, which often have divergent visions of the regional landscapes in a vast area constituting their common neighbourhood. The EU can be characterised as the promoter of normative regionalism, while Russia generates different forms of civilisational regionalism. Russia’s emphasis on the civilisational underpinnings of its regional integration model paves the way for two different strategies: one based on liberal imitation and replication of EU experiences in order to strengthen Russia’s position in the global neoliberal economy, and another grounded in illiberal contestation of the normative premises of the EU with the purpose of devising an ideologised alternative to the liberal West.     

Biopower and geopolitics as Russia’s neighborhood strategies: reconnecting people or reaggregating lands?

In this article, we address geopolitics and biopower as two different yet mutually correlative discursive strategies of sovereign power in Russia. We challenge the dominant realist approaches to Russia’s neighborhood policy by introducing the concept of biopolitics as its key element, which makes analysis of political relations in the post-Soviet area more nuanced and variegated. More specifically, we address an important distinction between geopolitical control over territories and management of population as two of Russia’s strategies in its “near abroad.”     

The Four Pillars of Russia’s Power Narrative

The Winter Olympic Games in Sochi and the annexation of Crimea were two major international events in which Russia engaged in early 2014. In spite of all the divergence in the logic underpinning each of them, four concepts strongly resonate in both cases. First, in hosting the Olympics and in appropriating Crimea, Russia was motivated by solidifying its sovereignty as the key concept in its foreign and domestic policies. Second, the scenarios for both Sochi and Crimea were grounded in the idea of strengthening Russia as a political community through mechanisms of domestic consolidation (Sochi) and opposition to unfriendly external forces (the crisis in Ukraine). Third, Sochi and Crimea unveiled two different facets of the logic of normalisation aimed at proving – albeit by different means – Russia’s great power status. Fourth, one of the major drivers of Russian policy in both cases were security concerns in Russia’s southern flanks, though domestic security was also an important part of the agenda.     

Contribution of the regions to Russian security policy

Andrey Makarychev is Professor of International Relations at the Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University in Russia.¹ His areas of expertise are security studies, regionalism and federalism and international relations theory. In 2001–02, Andrey was a guest scholar at the Zurich-based Centre for Security Studies and Conflict Research and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.     

Russia and its supporters in Europe: trans-ideology à la carte?

The impact of crisis in Ukraine on EU–Russia relations appears twofold. On the one hand, it revealed the high degree of disdain all across Europe to Moscow's neo-imperial approach. On the other hand, it unveiled a great deal of affection and sympathy to Kremlin's policy among a number of non-mainstream but significant groups within the EU. In this article, we mirror the major troubles of today’s Europe, as seen from Moscow’s perspective, with four nodal points of the Kremlin’s hegemonic discourse: social conservatism, nation state-based policies, independence from the US influence and the glorification of Russia’s self-inflicted mission of fighting contemporary neo-fascism. Our analysis of non-mainstream political parties in EU member states, sensitive and responsive to the Kremlin’s agenda, suggests that Putin's regime and Russia sympathizers in Europe pragmatically use each other, thereby challenging the classical ideological paradigms. This translates Russia’s policies into a trans-ideological repertoire of different discourses that differently resonate among the groups of Russia sympathizers.