Understanding Dual Identities in Poland

'Parallel' divisions of identity in Poland are a thing of the past – and perhaps the future – but not the present. Yet contemporary Poles are still politically divided by identities – albeit by 'nested' Polish/European identities rather than by 'parallel' ethnic identities. They are not divided between Polish and European identities, however, but between exclusive and dual identities – in essence a division between parochial and cosmopolitan identities. Contrary to fears that Europeanism in Poland especially might be narrow, culturally restrictive, or even racist, our data show that dual identities reflect broader cosmopolitan perspectives as well as specifically European or Western sympathies. There is a real significant difference of values between exclusive and dual identifiers which extends well beyond attitudes to Europe – and far beyond attitudes to the EU in particular. To a considerable degree this is a difference – some have argued a conflict – between traditional and modern Poland, between secular and devout Poland, between educated and ignorant Poland, between young and old Poland, and between hopeful and fearful Poland.     

Why is corruption in Poland ``a serious cause for concern'?

Public perceptions of corruption are significant for their political consequences. But they are conceptually and empirically distinct from corruption. First, because perceptions of corruption run far ahead of experience. Second, because different factors influence the one more than the other – indeed poverty and low education increase perceptions of corruption while decreasing participation in it. Third, because the political consequences of corruption and corruption-perceptions differ not only in degree but in their targets – perceptions and experiences of corruption erode trust in different politicians and institutions.External moralising from institutions such as the EU may reduce corruption in Accession States while simultaneously increasing perceptions of it. And within these states, that moralising `culture which can resist corruption' which the EU demands, itself tends, perversely, to increase (not decrease) perceptions, suspicions, and allegations of corruption.