ASEAN cooperation: the legacy of the economic crisis

This article examines the implications of domestic politicalchanges in the post-1997 era for ASEAN's regional cooperationand institutionalization. The conceptual framework traces regionalrelations to the makeup and grand strategies of domestic coalitions(internationalizing, hybrid, backlash). Had some predictionsin the immediate aftermath of the crisis been fulfilled, theadvent of domestic backlash coalitions would have portendedlower levels of regional cooperation. Alternatively, in theabsence of changes in the fundamental nature of most rulingcoalitions after the crisis, ASEAN's cooperative thrust wasexpected to be maintained. The article explores the extent towhich ASEAN's activities in the post-crisis era supports eitherof these two propositions. It finds that a shock of major proportionsin Southeast Asia led to some immediate challenges to bilateralrelations. At the same time, the aftermath of the crisis ledto considerable multilateral and bilateral cooperation on economicissues, expansion, intervention, and security. Furthermore,cooperation may have indeed improved despite subsequent crises,including 9/11 and its aftermath. Yet no linear progressionor irrevocable process towards internationalization or regionalcooperation can be assumed. Alternative coalitions, and theirpotential for changing regional trajectories, must be reckonedwith.     

Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional Impacts

This article introduces a conceptual design for mapping the domestic impact of internationalization. It proposes that internationalization leads to a trimodal domestic coalitional profile and advances a set of expectations about the regional effects of each profile. Aggregate data from ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states over five regions suggests that between 1948 and 1993 the three coalitional types differed in their international behavior. Internationalizing coalitions deepened trade openness, expanded exports, attracted foreign investments, restrained military-industrial complexes, initiated fewer international crises, eschewed weapons of mass destruction, deferred to international economic and security regimes, and strove for regional cooperative orders that reinforced those objectives. Backlash coalitions restricted or reduced trade openness and reliance on exports, curbed foreign investment, built expansive military complexes, developed weapons of mass destruction, challenged international regimes, exacerbated civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differentiation within their region, and were prone to initiate international crises. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently. These findings have significant implications for international relations theory and our incipient understanding of internationalization. Further extensions of the conceptual framework can help capture international effects that are yet to be fully integrated into the study of the domestic politics of coalition formation.