Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th Century

What kind of challenge does economic nationalism pose to economic liberalism in today's global political economy? Conventional wisdom holds that economic nationalism is an outdated ideology in this age of globalization and economic liberalization. But this argument rests on understandings of economic nationalism that are increasingly being called into question by recent scholarship. In this article, I show how the history of economic nationalism in the 19th century provides strong support for two important but potentially controversial arguments made in recent literature about the nature of economic nationalism: (1) that this ideology is most properly defined by its nationalist content (rather than as a variant of realism or as an ideology of protectionism), and (2) that it can be associated with a wide range of policy projects, including the endorsement of liberal economic policies. With these two points established through historical analysis, I conclude that economic nationalism should be seen still to be a powerful ideology in the current period, but that its relationship to the policy goals of economic liberals is an ambiguous one, just as it was in the 19th century.     

The Development Mandate of International Institutions: Where Did it Come From?

What was the origin of the commitment of international institutions to promote economic development in poorer countries? A popular view in “post-development” scholarship has been that this international development project was born with Truman’s Point Four program of 1949. This article suggests instead that it emerged for the first time in a significant way out of the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, with US-Latin American relations in the early 1940s acting as a key incubator for this innovation in international governance. This historical reinterpretation leads to a different view of the initial content of the international development project and the politics that generated it. It also challenges those who have downplayed the significance of the development content of the Bretton Woods negotiations.     

The less developed countries and the international monetary system

The functioning of the international monetary system is analyzed from the perspective of the less developed countries. They are shown to be significant beneficiaries of the introduction of special drawing rights in the International Monetary Fund, despite the unfavourable distribution formula, but to be confronted with exceptional difficulties in reserve management and exchange rate decision‐making in the period of currency turmoil since 1971. The currency realignments of these countries are summarized in terms of their decisions as to which major currencies to follow both in 1971 and 1973. Their interests in international monetary reform, particularly in the alternative SDR‐aid link proposals, are assessed. It is concluded that if the first‐best reform ‐ an altered distribution formula for SDR's in an SDR‐based system in which low interest rates for borrowers are retained ‐ cannot be achieved, the present system may carry more advantages for the less developed countries than a second‐best ‘link’ scheme.     

Subprime catalyst: Financial regulatory reform and the strengthening of US carbon market governance

The 2008 financial crisis has had an important, but neglected, impact on carbon market governance in the United States. It acted as a catalyst for the emergence of a domestic coalition that drew upon the crisis experience to demand stronger regulation over carbon markets. The influence of this coalition was seen first in the changing content of draft climate change bills between 2008 and 2010. But the coalition's more lasting legacy was its role in shaping the content of, and supporting, the passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd–Frank bill) in July 2010. Although that bill was aimed primarily at bolstering financial stability, its derivatives provisions strengthened carbon market regulation in significant ways. This policy episode demonstrates new patterns of coalition building in carbon market politics as well as the growing links between climate governance and financial regulatory politics. At the same time, the significance of these developments should not be overstated because of various limitations in the content and implementation of the Dodd–Frank bill, as well as the waning support for carbon markets more generally within the US since the bill's passage.