Congressional Vote Options

Numerous accounts reveal that congressional leaders often secure “hip‐pocket votes” or “if you need me” pledges from rank‐and‐file legislators. These are essentially options on votes. Leaders exercise sufficient options—pay legislators to convert to favorable votes—when those options will yield victory. Otherwise, they release the options. A model shows that this optimal strategy for leaders produces many small victories, few small losses, and losses that are, on average, larger than victories. We find precisely these patterns, hence strong evidence for vote options, in Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 2001 and in non‐key votes from the 106th Congress (1999–2000).     

WINNING COALITIONS AND ETHNO-REGIONAL POLITICS: THE FAILURE OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE 1990 AND 1995 ELECTIONS IN COTE D'IVOIRE

Why is that former dominant or single party regimes, especiallythose in Africa, have generally survived and even emerged strengthenedafter the introduction of multi-party competitive elections?In Côte d'lvoire since 1990 the ruling party has beenable to win elections by using incumbency to present itselfas the organization most likely to be capable of putting togethera winning coalition. In a society segmented by a multiplicityof cultural and religious divisions and where political poweris a zero-sum game, the logic of democratic representation meansthat no group can afford to be excluded. Yet in the 1990 and1995 Ivorian elections .the opposition attacked die ethnic characterof the government and deliberately mobilized ethnic minorities,regional and religious (Islamic) sentiments. They thereforefailed to escape, in electoral terms, from their extremely localizedstrongholds. Their attempt to mobilize around an anti-foreignerplatform in 1990 rebounded in 1995 when the government itselftook over their ‘ultra-nationalist’ stance by excludingnon-Ivorians from the elections. The consequent exclusion ofthe opposition's favoured Presidential candidate and the failureof the opposition alliance to agree on a non-northern, non-Islamicalternative candidate led to a violent boycott and the eventualcollapse of the opposition alliance.     

A PROACTIVE RESPONSE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE: THE RESULTS OF A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT

Recent British work has focused attention on preventing repeat victimization as part of an overall crime prevention strategy. Because domestic violence victims are among those most likely to suffer multiple victimizations, they are logical candidates for programs targeted at reducing repeat victimization.
This article reports on a joint law enforcement-social services approach to reduce the incidence of repeat domestic violence. The research design randomly assigned households reporting domestic incidents within two public housing police service areas in New York to receive or not receive a follow-up to the initial patrol response. (The follow-up visit was conducted by a police officer and a social worker.) In addition, housing projects in the same area were randomly assigned to receive or not receive public education about domestic violence.
Neither treatment produced a reduction in violence. However, households in projects that had received public education and households that received the follow-up visits were both more likely to report new violence to the police than households that did not receive the treatments. Moreover, the effect of the follow-up visit was most pronounced among households with more serious histories of violence. The results suggest that the interventions increased citizens' confidence in the ability of the police to handle domestic situations.