Does Wal-Mart reduce social capital?

Social capital has attracted increasing attention in recent years. We use county-level and individual survey data to study how Wal-Mart affects social capital. Estimates using several proxies for social capital—such as club membership, religious activity, time with friends, and other measures—do not support the thesis that “Wal-Mart destroys communities” by reducing social capital. We measure exposure to Wal-Mart two ways: Wal-Marts per 10,000 residents and Wal-Marts per 10,000 residents aggregated over the years since 1979 to capture a more cumulative “Wal-Mart Effect.” We find that the coefficients on Wal-Mart’s presence are statistically insignificant in most specifications.     

The behavioural consequences of institutional rules: republicans in the US house

The Republicans gained a majority in the US House from the 1994 elections, and upon taking office they rewrote the rules that determine legislative power relations. This paper combines a 1996 attitudinal survey of US Representatives with demographic information, status within the House, and party position to examine the impact of the 1995 rule changes on satisfaction, ambition, and retirement. This paper demonstrates that member reactions to reform are explained jointly by their partisanship and their relative position within their party. Senior members of any party dislike rules making power more exclusive, and dissatisfaction increases the likelihood of retirement.     

EU Merger Control: From Separate Jurisdictional Zones to a More Cooperative Architecture—A Possible Way Forward?

The paper is a call to re-ignite the debate over the future shape of the EU’s concentration or merger control architecture in the longer-term. The paper contributes to this debate by considering the efficacy of replacing the current merger control architecture of separate jurisdictional zones with a more cooperative approach. It demonstrates that the adoption of the cooperative architecture would result in a number of benefits relative to the operation of the current architecture. For in effectively resolving a major problem that has dogged the operational effectiveness of the current architecture since it became law in 1990, the misallocation problem, the proposed architecture would also lead to a strengthening of the application of the principle of subsidiarity in this field, be supportive of the reinterpreted more appropriate authority goal, and resolve the multiple notification issue. Further, by ending the multiple notification issue, the valued one-stop shop approach to merger regulation would be reinforced. Yet the paper recognises that the cooperative architecture itself is not concern free, for the cooperative approach in granting Member state regulators the right for the first time to apply EU merger law, albeit in certain circumstances only, creates the possibility of inconsistent decision-making across this network. This would distort the regulatory level playing field, undermining what the architecture is supposed to guarantee, the Single European Market. With this in mind, necessary safeguards are explained. The paper concludes by briefly commenting upon key systems that need to be in place to ensure the operational effectiveness of the cooperative architecture. Of course, and at the cost of stating the obvious, improving the protection of competition in the field of merger control in the longer-term requires a willingness on the part of the key stakeholders to look beyond the current architecture of separate jurisdictional zones.     

The GE/Honeywell merger controversy and the path to analytical convergence in international merger assessment: A critical commentary

Globalisation, with its concomitant rise in international merger activity, allied to the proliferation of merger control regimes vetting such activity, increases the likelihood of two or more competition authorities reaching divergent decisions in the same case. This article reveals that this situation arose in the proposed merger between two US-based companies, General Electric (GE) and Honeywell, with the EU prohibiting the merger, and the US Department of Justice approving it. Further, it discusses the analytical and interpretational differences which led to those divergent outcomes. The analytical debate centres on the appropriateness of the two theoretical approaches used to assess proposed mergers, with the EU using the range effects of competitive harm approach and the US giving greater weight to an economic efficiencies merger defence. The fallout from the GE/Honeywell case has given added impetus to progress analytical convergence in relation to the vetting of international mergers. This has found expression at the multilateral level, which links to EU initiatives. The article predicts that the EU is highly likely to incorporate an economic efficiencies defence into its merger control law, bringing it into line with other key players. Of course, analytical convergence cannot guarantee that interpretational differences will not arise, as was evident in aspects of the GE/Honeywell case. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.