From North Atlantic Neoliberalism to Market Pluralism

This article is based on the ideas contained in a longer essay by the two authors in the Winter issue of Challenge magazine. It was adapted by NPQ editor Nathan Gardels and approved and corrected by Salinas.     

Civil Service Reform in Latin America: External Referents Versus Own Capacities

In the context of state reform and democratisation in Latin America, reinforcing public institutions becomes critical to sustaining and consolidating realised gains. In this area, civil service reforms are critical. But civil service reform initiatives in Latin American countries were designed with different degrees of compatibility with countries’ administrative traditions and with the role played by the civil service within the political system. The results of different initiatives are described in a brief review of six key features of nine Latin American civil services. Discussion of these results allows us to draw conclusions about the capacity to generate learning dynamics. A new conception of the civil service and its role in the political system appears more evident, unless the required political consensus for implementing and consolidating the new reform strategy for most Latin American public administrations is not confirmed.     

Delegation Dilemmas: Coalition Size,Electoral Risk,and Regulatory Governance in New Democracies

This article addresses the determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty‐coalition governments. Previous research has mainly focused on U.S. institutions, producing context‐specific findings. We found electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size to be key factors explaining the bureaucratic autonomy of 31 state regulatory agencies recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. The legislative support that chief executives enjoy only acquires explanatory power when it is interacted with government turnover. Because Brazilian governors have great ability to build oversized majority coalitions, coalition strength influences the governor's strategy when the governor faces credible threats from rival elite groups.     

Exports and terms of trade in Argentina, 1811–1870

Abstract — This research note analyses the evolution of the Argentine external sector between 1811 and 1870. New series of exports and terms of trade are presented. These show the vulnerability of the economy to external and internal shocks, but also the continuous growth of total exports and per capita exports along the period.     

Banking on Accountability? Strengthening Budget Oversight and Public Sector Auditing in Emerging Economies

This study reviews a decade of support by the World Bank and the Inter‐American Development Bank to parliaments and external audit agencies in Latin America. It underscores recent developments in development finance reflecting a broader understanding of the determinants of fiscal credibility and financial integrity. It reveals a learning curve in multilateral assistance to budget oversight institutions. It argues that there exists unexplored potential to improve the effectiveness of multilateral assistance to budget oversight institutions, including in the choice of strategies and instruments. More fundamentally, it underscores the need to tackle the underlying political economy of public finance accountability.     

Policymaking in Multiparty Presidential Regimes: A Comparison between Brazil and Ecuador

This paper explores why two countries with similar electoral, partisan, and presidential institutions, have produced significantly different policy outcomes in Latin America. Brazil and Ecuador are conventionally known as having highly fragmented party systems, where legislators have great incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Presidents are perceived to be strong and to make large use of government resources in order to advance their agenda. Yet, policies in Brazil are more likely to respond to shocks and to be more stable over time than policies in Ecuador, where policies remain vulnerable to political changes and realignments. We argue that this variation is explained by the different nature of political coalitions formed in each country. We identify three factors that increase the executive's ability to craft governing coalitions in congress: the availability of valuable coalition currencies, the influence of long‐term political horizons, and the extent to which political transactions are credibly and effectively enforced.