Congressional Vote Options

Numerous accounts reveal that congressional leaders often secure “hip‐pocket votes” or “if you need me” pledges from rank‐and‐file legislators. These are essentially options on votes. Leaders exercise sufficient options—pay legislators to convert to favorable votes—when those options will yield victory. Otherwise, they release the options. A model shows that this optimal strategy for leaders produces many small victories, few small losses, and losses that are, on average, larger than victories. We find precisely these patterns, hence strong evidence for vote options, in Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 2001 and in non‐key votes from the 106th Congress (1999–2000).     

TESTS OF NONLINEAR DYNAMICS IN U.S. HOMICIDE TIME SERIES,AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS*

Attempts to explain temporal patterns in U.S. homicide data usually assume that a linear process accounts for the variation. A nonlinear process is an obvious alternative, however, and reasonable arguments suggest that nonlinearity may in part underlie homicide series dynamics. This paper applies tests for nonlinearity to national time series of homicide rates and counts. The results provide relatively little evidence of nonlinear structure; instead, a linear (random walk) process appears to generate most of the change in the series. Although this supports the unstated assumptions of current theories, it also raises questions about why homicides should follow a linear time path in the first place.     

A CROSS‐NATIONAL TEST OF BONGER'S THEORY OF CRIMINALITY AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS*

Using international data for 100 countries, we test two hypotheses derived from Bonger's Marxian theory of crime. The analyses support the hypothesis that the degree of capitalism significantly predicts homicide rates, but they fail to confirm that the de‐moralization of the population (loss of moral feelings for others) mediates the relationship between capitalism and homicide. Although capitalism is not the best predictor among those considered, overall, the results underline the importance of Bonger's ideas because both capitalism and corruption (our indicator of de‐moralization) show reasonably strong relationships with homicide rates and compete with other variables commonly used as predictors of international homicide rates. The results confirm the usefulness of attempting to subject Marxian ideas to positivist, quantitative tests, with an eye to integrating Marxian theories with other mainstream theories, such as institutional anomie theory.     

DEVELOPMENTAL AND LIFE‐COURSE CRIMINOLOGY: KEY THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES‐THE 2002 SUTHERLAND AWARD ADDRESS*

The main aim of this paper is to advance knowledge and (especially) theories about developmental and life‐course criminology (DLC). First, I review the widely accepted DLC findings that all DLC theories have been designed to explain. Second, I review more contentious and unresolved empirical DLC issues that might present challenges to DLC theories. Third, I describe my own DLC theory and specify how it addresses key empirical and theoretical questions. Fourth, I summarize five important DLC theories, by Catalano and Hawkins, Sampson and Laub, Moffitt, LeBlanc, and Thornberry and Krohn. Fifth, I identify differences in assumptions and predictions between my theory and the other five theories. Finally, I recommend a detailed comparison of the key features of all DLC theories, of their answers to key empirical and theoretical questions, and of their predictions regarding key unresolved empirical DLC issues.     

Explaining Seat Changes in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1950–98

Abstract: Recent U.S. House elections have challenged existing models of congressional elections, raising the question of whether or not processes thought to govern previous elections are still at work. Taking Marra and Ostrom's (1989) model of congressional elections as representative of extant theoretical perspectives and testing it against recent elections, we find that the model fails. We augment Marra and Ostrom's model with new insights, constructing a model that explains elections from 1950 to 1998. We find that, although presidential approval ratings and major political events continue to drive congressional elections, the distribution of open seats must also be taken into account.     

CAN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS BE INFLEXIBLE TECHNOLOGY? THE OPERATIONAL STRATEGY REVISITED

Recent failures of government information systems to achieve their objectives have highlighted the risk involved in large-scale information technology projects. This article looks at one example, the computerization of the UK social security system, in the light of recent discussions of large-scale technologies and the particular problem of inflexible technologies as defined by Collingridge. It is argued that large-scale government computing projects can fit the criteria of inflexible technologies, although this is not an inherent feature of information technology. There are always more flexible alternatives available: this is illustrated using examples from both private and public organizations.     

A Contractualist Defense of Democratic Authority

Abstract.  This paper provides a defense of the following thesis: When there is reasonable disagreement over the design of morally necessary collective action schemes, it would not be reasonable to reject the authority of a democratic decision procedure to settle these disputes. My first argument is a straightforward application of contractualist reasoning, and mirrors T. M. Scanlon's defense of a principle of fairness for the distribution of benefits produced by a cooperative scheme. My second argument develops and defends the intuition that treating others morally requires respecting their exercise of moral judgment, or a sense of justice. I conclude by addressing the problem of disagreement over the design of the democratic decision procedure itself, and rebutting Jeremy Waldron's claim that democratic authority is incompatible with judicial review.