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Bret N. Bogenschneider 《Liverpool Law Review》2017,38(2):207-230
Tax policy informed by Libertarian paternalism suggests that taxes should be levied on non-‘rational’ choice (i.e., where a person makes a ‘foolish’ decision by their own internal standards). In respect of excise taxes on sugar sweetened beverages, the regressivity of such policies can then be justified by reference to a progressive health effect, since the poor are more sensitive to changes in price and disproportionately tend to consume sugar sweetened beverages. However, as it currently stands, that conclusion is based merely on a presumption of irrationality of the poor as a class and neither the relative price of goods subject to such taxes, nor the associated ‘welfare loss’ from the levy of the tax, have been systematically measured. Such a presumption of non-‘rationality’ in food choice only holds with respect to persons who are not bound by relative prices of food, namely the wealthy. Accordingly, it is reasonable for scholars to consider the levy of excise taxes on unhealthy food consumed primarily by the wealthy (e.g., foie gras) as a ‘nudge’ toward a healthier food choice. Furthermore, the poor are rational agents capable of analysing and comparing relative prices of food products taking into account the health effects. As various scholars have now proposed in medical journals, any incremental tax levied on the poor in respect of sugar-sweetened beverages should be offset, for example, with a credit for healthy foods including fruits and vegetables. 相似文献
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Dickey B Orszag J Tyson L 《Annals of health law / Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, Institute for Health Law》2010,19(2):367-400, 2 p preceding i
This article demonstrates that in recent years, patent settlements between branded and generic manufacturers involving "reverse payments" from branded manufacturers to generic manufacturers have received close antitrust scrutiny, driven by concerns that such settlements harm consumers by delaying the entry of lower-priced generic drugs. The authors note that such settlements will be a focus of the Obama Administration's antitrust enforcement policy, yet there is a growing consensus among the courts that such settlements are anticompetitive only under narrow sets of circumstances. In this article, the authors present an analytical framework for evaluating the competitive effects of patent settlements, including those involving reverse payments, and demonstrate that these settlements can benefit consumers. Thus, the authors conclude that while continued scrutiny of such settlements is important, broad brush treatments are inappropriate and only a more individualized evaluation can correctly determine the competitive effects of a particular settlement agreement. 相似文献