A note on the non-maximality of the optimal fines when the apprehension probability depends on the offense rate

This paper reconsiders the problem of optimal law enforcement when the apprehension probability depends on the offense rate as well as policing expenditures. A natural consequence of such an apprehension probability is the possible multiplicity of the equilibrium due to strategic complementarity, and the actual offense rate is realized by the self-fulfilling nature of the offense rate. If people believe that lowering the fine will lead to a lower offense rate, each individual will be less inclined to commit an illegal activity due to their expectation of a higher apprehension probability. Thus, the maximal fine is not socially optimal in this case.     

Filing a Nuisance Claim to Induce Successive Lawsuits

In this article, I provide a rationale for nuisance suits. Ishow that a plaintiff may file a nuisance suit if he expectsthat his suit may induce suits by other plaintiffs. If an initialplaintiff is too pessimistic about this possibility, a nuisancesuit may not be filed even though it would be meritorious withjoinder with another plaintiff. In this case, lawyers may playthe role of reducing such coordination failure due to asymmetricinformation by providing potential plaintiffs with relevantinformation.     

Strict liability versus negligence when the injurer's activity involves positive externalities

In this paper, I assert that, if the potential injurer’s activity involves externalities unrelated to accidents, the strict liability rule minimizing only the social cost associated with accidents does not induce the social optimum. I also demonstrate that if the externalities are positive, the negligence rule can perform better than the strict liability rule by selecting the due care appropriately, whereas it cannot if the externalities are negative. This argument can be applied to the product liability law. JEL Classification K13     

A Proposal for a New Rule of Adverse Possession

In this paper, I propose a new rule of adverse possession whereby the occupier acquires title if the owner does not raise an objection to the occupation within the legal limitation and at the same time the owner himself has not met the legal standard of monitoring effort. I show that the proposed rule with suitably chosen legal standard of monitoring effort can improve efficiency relative to the current rule of adverse possession.     

Sanctions in Pre-Trial Discovery

In this paper, we make an economic analysis of various sanctions for disobedience to the discovery request in the common law tradition and in the civil law tradition mainly by examining their effects on settlement rates and social welfare. We find that sanctioning through inference discloses less information and encourages less settlements than both sanctioning by default judgment and sanctioning adopted in the civil law tradition. Also, we show that sanctioning through inference used together with financial sanction duplicates the outcome under default judgment if the penalty size is so chosen as to be equal to the defendant's discovery cost.     

A note on burdens of proof in civil litigation

It has been widely believed that who bears the burden of proof significantly affects the incentives of the legal parties. In particular, Hay and Spier (J Legal Stud 26:413–431, 1997) argues that if legal parties have a commonly accessible body of evidence (perfectly correlated pieces of evidence), the party who bears the burden of proof will present the evidence if and only if the evidence supports his position, while the other party (without the burden) will refrain from presenting it regardless of whether the evidence supports his position. In this paper, I claim that the result will be dramatically changed if the pieces of evidence that each party possesses are not perfectly correlated. I show that each party will present the evidence that supports his position whenever available, regardless of the burden of proof assignment. This implies that allocating the burden of proof does not matter in terms of information elicitation.     

Credible plea bargaining

This paper demonstrates that the role of plea bargaining as a screening device depends neither on the commitment to trial nor on the commitment to some prosecutorial expenditures. In a situation where a prosecutor cannot commit to trial nor spends resources to obtain more evidence, I find a semi-separating equilibrium in which the prosecutor makes an offer that can be accepted only by the guilty defendant with some positive probability, and then, if the offer is rejected, he proceeds to trial, based on his updated belief. I also consider the prosecutor’s decision to choose the amount of (per capita) prosecutorial expenditures both in the commitment case and in the noncommitment case, and argue that an increase in the per capita expenditure may reduce the gross expenditures on prosecution by lowering the chance of trial.