The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements

We empirically test the role of membership rules and voting schemes for climate change coalitions with the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation. We apply three stability concepts that capture the notion of open membership and exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting. We show that exclusive membership leads to superior outcomes than open membership and that unanimity voting is preferable to majority voting in welfare and environmental terms. Our results suggest restricting membership in future international environmental agreements and they provide a rationale for unanimity voting as applied in many international organizations.     

Why is methenamine detected in Goma-2 dynamites originally methenamine free? An interpretation of relevant forensic results

After the train bombing in Madrid (Spain) on 11 March 2004, methenamine was detected in some of the specimens of Goma-2 ECO dynamite submitted to the forensic laboratories when analyzed by gas chromatography coupled with mass spectrometry detection (GC-MS). Methenamine is synthesized from formaldehyde and ammonia through a condensation reaction. However, neither methenamine nor any of these compounds were used to manufacture Goma-2 ECO dynamite. Four different experiments were designed in order to explain the presence of methenamine detected in the dynamite samples analyzed. In the first one, GC-MS was used to analyze the individual components of Goma-2 ECO provided by the manufacturer and the components mixed in a raw paste. Methenamine was detected in the manufacturer's ammonium nitrate and in the raw paste. The other experiments were designed to find the precursors sources for methenamine generation in Goma-2 ECO. Results revealed that these sources could be ammonium nitrate for ammonia and sawdust for formaldehyde. Under heating conditions, dynamite could produce these precursors, which could condense in the injection port of the GC-MS system and generate methenamine. However, methenamine was not always detected in these dynamites. This was explained by the existence of two opposite effects: (a) dynamite stability makes difficult that ammonium nitrate releases ammonia and (b) there is a gradual loss of formaldehyde in sawdust along the time. Both effects can prevent the formation of an amount of methenamine large enough to be detected.     

Study of losses of volatile compounds from dynamites. Investigation of cross-contamination between dynamites stored in polyethylene bags

The purpose of this work was to study the appropriateness of polyethylene bags for the preservation of explosive specimens. To this end, specimens of two types of dynamites, Goma-2 EC, containing nitroglycol (EGDN) and dinitrotoluene (DNT), and Goma-2 ECO, containing only EGDN, were placed individually inside bags and introduced into hermetically sealed glass jars, which were stored for a period of time. Losses of volatile compounds were studied by headspace analysis using gas chromatography coupled to mass spectrometry (GC-MS). The cross-contamination between dynamites was studied by using high performance liquid chromatography with mass spectrometry (HPLC-MS) to analyse the extracts obtained after a sequential solvent extraction of these specimens. Polyethylene bags permit the loss of volatile compounds since EGDN and DNT were detected in the headspaces of the jars. Moreover, cross-contamination between dynamites was also demonstrated since DNT content decreased in the dynamite containing this compound and increased in the dynamite that had not contained it.     

The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.