Does conflict begin at home?—using family dynamics to understand The Hindu-Muslim conflict in British India; 1907–1947

ABSTRACT

Despite common use of the term ‘sibling-rivalry’ for Hindu-Muslim conflict in British India, there are few or no attempts to explain this phenomenon from a proper theoretical foci. By employing an indigenous interpersonal conflict model, this article seeks to examine Hindu-Muslim conflict in the pre-partition period. This draws on the dynamics of intimate rivalry among family members to explain Hindu-Muslim conflict dynamics from a fresh psycho-cultural perspective. The institution of joint-family is the most pervasive and the most influential institution in the subcontinent shaping certain views regarding the functioning of other institutions in society; including in the political sphere. People use the concrete knowledge learned inside their families to reason about more abstract phenomena such as group conflict. Therefore, the conflict dynamics associated with the family institution are extrapolated onto intergroup conflicts.     

Microcycles of Terrorist Violence in Turkey: a Spatio-temporal Analysis of the PKK Attacks

Asian Journal of Criminology - Geography and time are the two constraints on illegal acts. The extant research on terrorism suggests that terrorists make an expected cost-benefit analysis, and thus...     

Islamist moderation in perspective: comparative analysis of the moderation of Islamist and Western communist parties

What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each form of moderation? Although a prevalent question in recent years, less is known about the causes and forms of Islamist moderation in a systematic fashion. By building on the findings of Communist moderation literature, we introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist party moderation over time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation refers to the kind of moderation where radical parties make a decision on whether to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve ideological goals without compromising their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors and state repression are causes of tactical moderation. Ideological moderation pertains to shifts in a platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes (economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) to gain greater popular support. Empirically, we analyse the Italian Communist Party and the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco in a comparative perspective. In providing evidence through structured comparisons and field interviews, we hope to advance a more universal, generalizable theory of radical party moderation.     

Between anti-westernism and development: political Islam and environmentalism

As Turkey's Gezi Park protests reminded us, Islamist parties the world over demonstrate utter disregard of the environment in their discourse and actions. However, Islam as a religion places strong emphasis on environmental protection. Thus, as the representatives of Islam that these parties claim themselves to be, it is puzzling that environmental policy is all but absent from most Islamist platforms. I ask, what explains the poverty of Islamists in regards to the environment? I argue that the reason for this poverty is found within and conforms to political Islam's problematic relationship with modernity, particularly in regards to their strong anti-western sentiment and self-purported victim status. My findings suggest that the inattention Islamists give to the environment is due to their association of environmentalism with the West and because of the uniquely unfavourable socio-economic environments in which they exist, which sends environmentalism to the purview of ‘low politics’. This analysis points to an inherent weakness in Islamist ideology – their lack of pragmatic policy. Hence, the peculiar case of Islamists and the environment is but a symptom of a larger issue within Islamism and can be a key element to understanding why and how Islamism is likely to fail.     

Towards a new paradigm of the right to self-determination in the world trading system

There has been a shifting meaning of the right to self-determination, since World War Ⅱ, from territorial decolonisation into other meanings such as the right for indigenous people, minorities, ethnics groups and women＇s rights in the territories of independent states. Furthermore, the new phenomenon signifies that it is also used implicitly in the world trading system by states in maintaining their sovereignty from trade liberalization. This has been a dilemma in understanding the right to self-determination within international law. This paper, however, critically evaluates the potential applicability of the right to self-determination in the world trading architecture. It begins by examining the origins, evolution and current struggle to the right to self-determination in the world trading system. It then addresses in General Exceptions, Safeguard Measures and Special and Preferential Treatment as existing and applied principles in the World Trade Organization. It is highlighted that the real world still needs the right to self-determination as a means of struggling for economic justice. The right to self-determination has shifted from the right to transfer territory politically into the right to the transfer of welfare economically and in particular, the right to self-determination of people into the fight to self-determination of states.     

Transparency and political moral hazard

This paper analyzes the effects of asymmetric information on the public control of politicians in a world where the politicians’ pre-election promises are not credible. We study a model with identical politicians and a representative voter whose interests conflict with those of the politicians’. The voter’s decision to reelect the politician depends on both observable policies of the politician and the outcome of the unobservable policies. In equilibrium, either optimal decisions for the voter are not taken by the politician or if taken, the politician would extract more rent. In the latter case, politicians are also replaced more frequently.