Law, autonomy and advance directives

The principle of autonomy underpins legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The primacy of autonomy in this domain is recognised expressly in the case law, through judicial pronouncement, and implicitly in most Australian jurisdictions, through enactment into statute of the right to make an advance directive. This article seeks to justify autonomy as an appropriate principle for regulating advance directives and relies on three arguments: the necessity of autonomy in a liberal democracy; the primacy of autonomy in medical ethics discourse; and the uncontested importance of autonomy in the law on contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. This article also responds to key criticisms that autonomy is not an appropriate organising principle to underpin legal regulation of advance directives.     

Adarand v. pena: turning challenges into opportunities

This article provides a historical and legal overview of preference and set-aside programs. Further, the barriers and driving forces that have influenced preference programs are discussed. Finally, the processes, strategies, programs, and criteria employed at the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, to meet the test of strict scrutiny in Adarand, will be explored and analyzed as alternatives for preference programs.     

Admitting evidence of a defendant's previous conviction (PCE) and its impact on juror deliberation in relation to both juror‐processing style and juror concerns over the fairness of introducing PCE

Purpose. To examine the impact of admitting previous conviction evidence (PCE) on juror and jury deliberation. Major questions are: (1) Is there is an association between the inclusion of PCE and confidence in a defendant's guilt using a relatively rich trial simulation? (2) Does PCE invoke jurors’ considerations of fairness to the defendant? (3) Is heuristic processing (HP) associated with a prejudicial interpretation of evidence? Methods. In experiment 1 (n= 82), individual jurors were asked to recall evidence, express opinion, and justify verdicts on the two counts of Affray and Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH). In experiment 2 (new n= 121), PCE information was emphasized and a jury deliberation condition was included. Results. There was no simple association between admitting PCE and judgements of guilt. However, both interviews and jury deliberations indicated careful consideration of evidence. In particular, juror arguments showed that some were troubled by PCE, which they saw as unwarranted and therefore unfair to the defendant. Finally, HP was associated with both a prejudicial focus on the defendant's character and a higher confidence in guilt. Conclusions. A simple link between PCE and judgements of guilt may only hold in relatively circumscribed experimental simulations. Results also indicate that the introduction of PCE is unlikely to aid evidence‐based deliberation without careful testing of different forms of judges’ explanation concerning PCE.