Editorial

Criminal Law and Philosophy -     

Political Neutrality and Punishment

This paper is concerned with the tensions that arise when one juxtaposes one important liberal understanding of the nature and use of state power in circumstances of pluralism and (broadly) retributive accounts of punishment. The argument is that there are aspects of the liberal theory that seem to be in tension with aspects of retributive punishment, and that these tensions are difficult to avoid because of the attractiveness of precisely those features of each account. However, a proper understanding of both liberalism and retributive punishment allows us to dissolve some of the tensions whilst also bringing each position into sharper relief. The paper begins by introducing the liberal position and outlining the apparent tensions that may arise with retributive punishment. In so doing, there is also a brief discussion of how this debate relates to the more familiar dispute between legal moralists and their opponents. The paper then proceeds by considering each of the areas of tension in turn.     

Liberty: human rights and mental health

In this paper, Lord Phillips reflects on the present state of the law relating to mental health; he considers the place of the common law doctrine of necessity as the basis for the detention of patients; he reviews a number of issues arising from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and a number of recent decisions of the Court of Appeal. Finally, he considers the prospects for change in the law foreshadowed in the Government's White Paper on the Reform of Mental Health Law (2000).     

Responsibility, Luck, and the 'Equality of What?' Debate

Ronald Dworkin's recently published book, Sovereign Virtue (hereafter SV), appeals to arguments that are popular within, and ideas that are fundamental to, liberal egalitarianism. These arguments and ideas need to be distinguished and unpacked. The purpose of this paper is partly to do this and to cast doubt on the adequacy of various moves made by Dworkin. In addition, and more importantly I argue that the analysis of the 'equality of what?' debate reveals a tension at the heart of contemporary liberal egalitarianism between the Kantian aspiration to eliminate luck and the contemporary aspiration to do political philosophy without metaphysics.