Are innovative, participatory and deliberative procedures in policy making democratic and effective?

Abstract.  The overall project aims to establish a dialogue between normative democratic theory and research on policy formulation and implementation. This introductory article first notes the growth of various participatory and deliberative procedures in policy making, portrays the context of this growth and justifies the cases selected. It then presents the conceptual framework used for the study of these procedures, which mainly draws on participatory and deliberative democratic theory and the literature on the shift from 'government' to 'governance'. Based on this conceptual framework, the article focuses on four research questions the authors consider particularly important for the assessment of the contribution of the devices under scrutiny to democratic and effective decision making: questions of openness and access (input-legitimacy); questions regarding the quality of deliberation (throughput); questions of efficiency and effectiveness (output-legitimacy); and the issue of their insertion into the public space (questions of transparency and accountability).     

Major findings and paths for research: A concluding note

Abstract.  In this concluding note, the editors of this special issue first produce a synthesis of the findings of the empirical cases. Regarding delegation problems in the participatory devices under scrutiny, the conclusions are contrasting, and the outcome depends very much on the institutional design of each procedure, and on the kind of skills that are necessary to participate. Regarding the quality of deliberations, moderately positive conclusions are reached as a rule. With respect to the efficiency of these mechanisms, the results are much more limited: their decisional impact is weak, with the exception of the most elitist mechanisms, and the procedures under scrutiny did not seem to have any lasting integrative or 'educative' effects on the participants. Also, the situation with respect to transparency is problematic: there is no link between the degree of formalisation and influence on decisions, and most mechanisms are weakly publicised. In the end, the editors underline shifts in legitimacy principles induced by these procedures and sketch some paths for future research that should include a survey of the interplay between these procedures, the representative framework at large and other kinds of shifts in policy making.     

In Search of Culture: Lessons From the Past to Find a Role for the Study of Administrative Culture

H. Eckstein could say a few years ago that “political culture theory may plausibly be considered one of two still viable general approaches to political theory and explanation proposed since the early fifties to replace the long-dominant formalism-legalism of the field — the other being political rational choice theory” (1988, 789). For the last two decades, the rational choice approach has been dominant and thriving in many fields of political science, whether in international relations, political sociology, public administration or public policy; it has greatly reinforced the theoretical and empirical basis of the explanation of human freedom of action. But it has recently shown some signs of intellectual fatigue. Critics now underscore that, assuming that individuals compare expected benefits and costs of actions prior to adopting strategies for action, is valid and useful only in relatively simple choice situations where information is easily available and interpretable (Elster 1989; Dunleawy 1991). Some neo-institutionalists have claimed that rationality comes not as means-end calculus prior to action but rather as an ex-post justification after choice (March, Olsen 1989; Hall 1986, 15–20). Others have come to say that the rational choice approach, which explains how people ought to act in order to achieve aims and not what these aims ought to be, totally misses the central question of why it is that people have “preferences” and pursue some aims rather than others (Wildavsky 1987; Cook, Levi 1990; Wildavsky 1994). It does not mean that the rational choice approach should be discarded: there should rather be a “contextualization” of rationality which explains both why the same man in different situations or contexts adopts different rationalities, and why in the same context two men can adopt different rationalities (Wildavsky 1994). But the rational choice approach is also showing its limits in the very field where it was born and has blossomed: economics. In a recent issue of a French national newspaper, two articles dealing with economics and development were pointing at the same problem: cultural explanations of economic behavior are needed. In the first article, the former General Secretary of the United Nations, now President of the UNESCO-UNO World Commission on Culture and Development, J. Perez de Cuellar, advocated a cultural approach of the economic development of the Third World countries in order to find, at last, an enduring and practical solution to their endemic problems (1994). In the second article, a journalist reflecting on why the same hard economic therapies have worked in Poland but not in Russia could only refer to the “specific economic culture of Russia” described by economists (Vernholes 1994). These clear limits imposed upon the rational choice approach have brought culturalist theory back into favor among social scientists. Does this mean that a well-built culturalist theory might be a new “explanatory panacea, a universal nostrum” (Thompson, Ellis, Wildavsky 1992, 516)? The aim of this article is to try to unravel the cultural approach and assess its potential in the specific field of public administration. To do this, we shall draw on two close but relatively separate disciplines — political science and organizational theory — which we believe (should) meet to give a richer account of administrative reality. Our purpose is to question the recent interest in and utilization of the cultural metaphor(s) by bureaucrats, politicians, “special advisers” and authors in the analysis and implementation of administrative reform. The reason for this inquiry is that, contrary to analysts of private sector organizations, specialists of public sector organizations have not yet seriously addressed a culturalist theory of public administration while acknowledging that there is or there are public administration culture(s). We therefore hope to evaluate the usefulness of a culturalist theory for public administration. In this rather complex theoretical field, we prefer to take the simple solution to try to explain first the classical culturalist theory, and second, the new culturalist theory. Third, we should see whether there is or should be anything specific about administrative culture and a culturalist theory of public administration.     

National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union

This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game-theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more likely to express dissent. However, when they do express dissent, they vote ‘No’ more often. Parliamentary control depends on the presence of formal oversight institutions as well as the motivation of parliamentarians to hold their governments accountable. Empirical support is found in an analysis of votes on 1,387 legislative proposals that represent more than a decade of Council decision making in the period 2004–2014. This article contributes to the discussion on the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs, and clearly distinguishes the different forms of dissent in Council decision making.     

Social Justice and Individual Ethics*

Abstract. If one is committed to a “Rawlsian” conception of justice, is one not also necessarily committed to a “Christian” personal ethics? MOE explicitly, if one believes that social justice requires the maximinning of material conditions, should one not use one's time and resources as well as one can in order to assist the poorest? The paper offers a very partial answer to these questions by arguing for the following two claims: (1) Contrary to what is implied by some egalitarian critics of Rawls, the idea of a well-ordered society does not require maximin-guided choices at the individual level, and hence leaves room for legitimate incentive payments. (2) Despite Rawls's own neglect of this fact, a limited form of patriotism does constitute an individual “natural duty” following from a commitment to maximin social justice.     

Understanding Organizational Reforms in the Modern State: Specialization and Integration in Norway and France

This article examines the challenge Norway and France face in coordinating specialized government activities after 10 years of comprehensive reforms. The focus is on the tension between territorial and sectoral specialization and between vertical and horizontal specialization. We describe both sector‐specific administrative reforms and more overarching general reforms, looking at similarities and differences in the reorganization choices made by the two countries and also at what drives change. We argue that a combination of factors is required to explain outcomes. These factors include not only home‐grown reforms but also sectoral challenges, diffusion and learning from abroad, adaptation to the financial crisis and budget deficit, and choices made by powerful political executives. Sometimes these factors work together and reinforce each other, producing radical reforms; at other times they have a mutually constraining influence, resulting in only minor changes.