TRANSFORMATION: THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF ACADEMIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

The transformatory paradigm of post-apartheid South Africa hasleft few of the country's institutions free of critical scrutiny.Higher education has been no exception. As elsewhere in Africaunder new post-colonial governments, South African universitieshave a relatively high profile on the agenda of change. Thisinterest has been spurred not only by the ANC government's awarenessof its large share in the funding of universities but also becauseof the political imperatives engendered by the disaffectionagainst the historically white universities (HWU's) among itsyouth constituency. This article assesses the current interplaybetween universities and their new environment and focuses onthe following issues central to the debate on university transformation:the higher education heritage of apartheid; the impact of thechanging racial profile of students at HWU's; perceptions ofthe role of universities; affirmative action staffing policies;competing claims by universities, the government and the privatesector on scarce black and especially African human resources;the negative implications of the African brain drain from universitieson civil society; and the question of Afrocentrism versus Eurocentrism.Where relevant these issues are examined against the backdropof the African experience. In doing so a number of yet to beresolved problems are highlighted.     

MENTORS AND CRIMINAL ACHIEVEMENT*

Much of the research focusing on conventional occupations concludes that mentored individuals are more successful in their careers than those who are not mentored. Early research in criminology made a similar claim. Yet contemporary criminology has all but ignored mentors. We investigate this oversight, drawing on Sutherland's insights on tutelage and criminal maturation and incorporating ideas on human and social capital. We argue that mentors play a key role in their protégés' criminal achievements and examine this hypothesis with data from a recent survey of incarcerated adult male offenders in the Canadian province of Quebec. In this sample, a substantial proportion of respondents reported the presence of an influential individual in their lives who introduced them to a criminal milieu and whom they explicitly regarded as a mentor. After studying the attributes of offenders and their mentors, we develop a causal framework that positions criminal mentor presence within a pathway that leads to greater benefits and lower costs from crime.     

PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL ACHIEVEMENT: WILSON AND ABRAHAMSE REVISITED

Even though intense cultural pressures for monetary success and an institutional social structure dominated by the economy are viewed in anomie theory as stimulating criminal motivations and accounting for criminal behavior with an instrumental character, patterns in criminal earnings have not attracted much scholarly and empirical attention. Wilson and Abrahamse's (1992) analysis of Rand's second inmate survey concluded that most inmates interviewed during the survey had overestimated their monthly criminal earnings in an effort to rationalize their poor criminal performances. In this paper, we conduct, using Rand's first survey, a reanalysis of inmates' self-reported monthly earnings. We conclude that meaningful patterns in criminal achievements easily emerge when allowed to do so. These patterns offer a telling story about differential criminal opportunities. Wilson and Abrahamse's emphasis on temporal inconsistency and response bias (boosting past benefits of crime) misrepresents the facts of that story and misjudges those persons agreeing to tell it. It is concluded that for a "criminal subculture" to have any persuasive or binding effect, its participants must be reasonably assured that their chances of making "crime pay" are not so remote as to become unattainable.     

CRIMINAL ACHIEVEMENT, OFFENDER NETWORKS AND THE BENEFITS OF LOW SELF-CONTROL

This study follows recent research on criminal earnings and examines the impact of underlying traits (low self-control) and personal organization features (nonredundant networking) on the criminal earnings of a sample of incarcerated offenders previously involved in market and predatory crimes. Controlling for various background factors (age, noncriminal income, lambda and costs of doing crime), both low self-control and nonredundant networking independently explain why some offenders are more successful than others in achieving higher monetary standards through crime. Although efficient, brokerage-like networking enhances market offenders' earnings, low self-control emerges as an asset for predatory offenders: the lower their self-control, the higher their criminal earnings. For market offenders, however, low self-control has no direct effect, but it does mitigate the impact of effective networking on criminal earnings. The results emerging from this study have implications for Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory of crime and the advent of a criminal network perspective. Extensions are also made toward the conventional/criminal embeddedness framework and deterrence research.     

Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through Its Instruments—From the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation

Public policy instrumentation and its choice of tools and modes of operation are treated either as a kind of evidence (governing means making regulations, taxing, entering into contracts, communicating, etc.) or as if the questions it raises (the properties of instruments, justifications for choosing them, their applicability, etc.) are part of a rationality of methods without any autonomous meaning. This paper aims to explain the significance of a political sociology approach to public policy instruments in accounting for processes of public policy change: (1) public policy instrumentation is a major issue in public policy, since it reveals a (fairly explicit) theorization of the relationship between the governing and the governed: every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it; and (2) instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which structure public policy according to their own logic.