Technology and Politics: Have the ICTs Turned into a Domain for Civil–Military Relations in Turkey?

The implications of technology have been widely acknowledged in international relations. Studies ranging from the causes of war and military effectiveness to terrorism and nuclear proliferation have explored how technology shapes international politics. However, the implications of technology in domestic politics have not been scrutinised much. This paper helps fill this vacuum through an analysis of Turkey’s civil–military relations. Although civilian control over the Turkish military has improved in the past decade, this process has not been smooth. With a focus on the recent court cases involving the military, the 2007 e-memorandum and the transfer of electronic military intelligence apparatus to the civilian authority, this paper demonstrates how technology has become an important domain for civil–military relations in Turkey.     

Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and civilian control over the Turkish Armed Forces

Although most scholars of Turkey’s civil-military relations argue that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency has led to a decrease in civilian control over the Turkish military from the 1980s onwards, this has not always been the case. This article argues that the presence or the degree of the PKK threat is not sufficient to explain the civil-military balance of power in Turkey throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Instead, the article shows that in the face of the PKK threat, three major factors have influenced the behaviours of both civilian and military policy-makers in Turkey and shaped the level of civilian control. These factors are first, the Turkish political leaders’ control over their political parties and these parties’ control of a majority of seats in the parliament; second, how negatively or positively the military perceives the political leadership; and third, European Union pressures for democratisation.     

Turkey's Military Victory over the PKK and Its Failure to End the PKK Insurgency

This article explores the major reasons why Turkey could not end the PKK insurgency despite its military defeat in the late 1990s. It argues that Turkish governments have failed to sufficiently address two key aspects of their low-intensity conflict with the PKK, namely the fact that the PKK is not just a group of armed militants, but rather a complex insurgent organization and that it appeals to a large number of Kurds. Turkey's inability to definitively quell the PKK insurgency raises significant questions regarding the justification and effectiveness of the use of military force in dealing with insurgencies.