Influence of confidence inflation and explanations for changes in confidence on evaluations of eyewitness identification accuracy

Guidelines for conducting police line‐ups typically recommend immediate assessment of eyewitness confidence following identification. This confidence level can presumably be used to estimate accuracy even in the presence of subsequently inflated confidence. In this experiment, we examined students' perceptions of immediate and inflated confidence and whether their reliance on confidence varies as a function of the explanations given by the eyewitness for her inflated confidence. Each of 126 university students viewed one of five versions of a videotaped officer–eyewitness interaction depicting an eyewitness identification and follow‐up interview in which the eyewitness gave a (1) high or (2) moderate level of confidence or inflated her confidence and gave a (3) confidence epiphany, (4) memory contamination, or (5) no explanation for the inflation. The memory contamination and confidence epiphany explanations led to lower ratings of identification accuracy as compared to the high‐confidence control condition, supporting the immediate confidence recommendation but in some ways contradicting previous research on this issue. The results suggest the need for further research to understand the conditions under which confidence inflation influences juror evaluations of eyewitness identification.     

Due Process and the Death Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials

Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument during the penalty phase of capital trials can be defined as any disparaging or prejudicial statements calculated to influence the jury to consider improper factors in determining life in prison or the death penalty (Gaskill, 1991, p. 13). Improper statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument may jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair trial. While acknowledging such statements as misconduct, courts sometimes permit them on the theory that the presence of improper statements in closing argument would not change the juries' verdicts and therefore are not fundamentally unfair (Chapman v. California, 1967). The present study examined whether improper statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument during the penalty phase of a capital trial would result in more death penalty recommendations. Three hundred and twenty jury-eligible individuals viewed a videotape based on the penalty phase of an actual capital trial (Brooks v. State, 1977). Individuals exposed to improper statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument recommended the death penalty significantly more often than those not exposed to the statements.