The strategy of raising counterfeiters’ costs in luxury markets

A luxury monopolist can prefer increasing its net profits by raising the costs of a competitive fringe of counterfeiters compared to a situation where it can completely drive them out of the market. The mechanism underpinning this outcome results from the fact that counterfeiters can generate net revenues for the luxury monopolist because (1) sanctions imposed to counterfeiters are shaped and pocketed by the luxury monopolist under cover of deterrence (2) costs and profit loss due to counterfeiters and incurred by the luxury monopolist can be less than what is usually assumed. Moreover, the presence of counterfeits can be considered as promotional devices that signal the true luxury cachet, increases the snob value of the counterfeited brand and rewards high-end designers in a non-monetary way. In short, counterfeiting is like the light of the sun: it can burn the genuine firm but living without can be more harmful for the genuine firm.     

Transsexualism in medicolegal limine: an examination and a proposal for change

This article investigates transsexualism and our creation of a state of medicolegal limine for transsexuals. The article addresses transsexuality as it is currently defined and explores our dichotomization of sex and gender. The author discusses both the social construction and the praxis of transsexuality, highlighting the medicolegal implications resulting from our current approach to transsexuality. The author argues that the creation of a medicolegal limine essentially prevents transsexuals from ever integrating fully as a member of one sex or gender, while simultaneously preventing the larger society from reconsidering its definitions of sex and gender. The article concludes with a summary of current challenges to our model of transsexualism and with suggestions for the resolution of this liminal medicolegal phase.     

Substituting piracy with a pay-what-you-want option: does it make sense?

Rather than tolerating piracy or increasing sanctions, an artist can release his product directly to consumers by allowing them to download it under a ‘pay-what-you-want’ online strategy. We show analytically that this strategy can (1) be more profitable than a strategy with perfect or imperfect intellectual property rights enforcement for the artist and (2) change the organization and allocation of added value between artists and publishers along the supply chain. This higher profit result is achieved through an increased demand for live performance and positive voluntary contributions of downloaders directly pocketed by the artist. Indeed, a ‘pay-what-you-want’ strategy allows artists to reduce piracy without using sanctions while benefiting from a strategic negotiation ‘weapon’ in the relationship with record labels. Moreover, consumers draw procedural utility from the way the product is delivered. Counter-intuitively, rather than advocating for elimination of conventional releases at posted prices, pay-what-you-want strategies may need them to remain successful. A brief case study of Radiohead’s experiment and anecdotal evidence are developed to support these theoretical insights. Some implications regarding the re-organization of the supply chain and property rights regime are drawn.     

Comparing the efficiency of different scheme's under “Bharat NirmanYojana”: A Malmquist DEA analysis

The development of rural infrastructure is an important component in improving the standard of living in developing countries. In India, the government has taken up numerous measures to contribute toward the development of rural infrastructure, thereby initiating the Bharat Nirman Yojana (BNY). In this research study, the Malmquist model of input‐oriented DEA has been conducted to determine the efficiency of six schemes of the BNY for the time period of 2013–2015. The input variables selected were; designated investment and total amount released by the central government against the output variable of number of villages covered or achieved. The analysis of the data observed that only the telecommunication scheme has constant efficiency of 1.000 for all the years. On the other hand, the least efficiency from the Constant Return to Scale model was found for Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP) (0.014 for 2013; 0.026 for 2014 and 0.007 for 2015). Again, the Variable Return to Scale model indicated technical efficiency for the electrification scheme and telecommunication for all the years. Further, in terms of technical efficiency, all the schemes had decreasing change where Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) showed the highest change with 99.98% and the telecommunication scheme reflected the least change. Furthermore, the productivity index was found to be highest for Telecommunications (1.443) followed by AIBP (1.312), and the lowest productivity index was found for Rajiv Gandhi Gramin Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) (0.353). Thus, it was interpreted that among all the schemes, telecommunications scheme was the most efficient.