The Consistency of WTO Rules: Can the Single Undertaking Be Squared with Variable Geometry?

The diversity of countries that negotiate commitments in theWorld Trade Organization (WTO), and the distinctions betweentheir legal and constitutional systems, implies important differencesin how agreements are approved, implemented, and enforced. Althoughconsistency is among the desirable attributes to which the multilateraltrading system should strive, it cannot be achieved at the expenseof all other desiderata. Among the reasons for relaxation ofthis goal is the need to accommodate the different legal systemsand levels of economic development among Member States, as wellas the demands for flexibility in negotiations. This paper reviewsthe development and current status of the debate over consistencyin the multilateral system, with special emphasis on the perspectivesof three different sets of participants: the United States,the European Union (EU), and developing countries. In the trade-offbetween the depth and the width of the trading system, the paperasks whether WTO Members should be more interested in expandingthe scope of globally agreed rules or in securing countries’adherence to them? It explores the possible consequences forthe Doha Development Agenda (DDA) if the US Congress cannotbe convinced to make a new grant of trade promotion authority(TPA) after the current one expires. It also discusses whetherthe single undertaking should continue to shape the terms ofthe DDA. In discussing the WTO’s approach to decision-makingand the possible need for reforms thereto, the paper also considershow best and on what grounds should new issues be introducedon the negotiating agenda. The paper argues that whether ornot the DDA is conducted on the basis of a single undertaking,and with or without TPA, the multilateral trading system willcontinue to provide for less than full consistency.     

Multilateral Rules on Investment: Is Forward Movement Possible?

This paper explores the forces that have to date impeded thedevelopment of a multilateral set of rules on investment. Thepaper chronicles the policy- and rule-making debates that tookplace in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s)Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI) and advances anumber of political economy reasons that contributed to thederailment of investment discussions under the Doha DevelopmentAgenda (DDA). The paper highlights elements of a development-friendlyinternational investment regime and identifies various scenariosfor imparting forward movement to international negotiationson investment issues at the bilateral, regional and multilaterallevels.