Informal Institutions and Judicial Independence in Paraguay, 1954–2011

This article explains how informal institutions have prevented the emergence of autonomous judges in Paraguay between 1954 and 2011. The central argument is that co‐optation, clientelism, and judicial corruption considered as informal institutions, rooted during the dictatorship, have impeded the appearance of an independent judicial branch in the democratic regime. To test this hypothesis, the article relies on historical narratives, surveys, and semistructured interviews. The conclusions suggest that in countries that have experienced the consolidation of informal institutions oriented toward maintaining the ties of subordination of judges to politicians, constitutional reforms and fragmentation of political power are necessary but not sufficient conditions for improving judicial independence.     

BRINGING PEACE TO THE LATINO COMMUNITY

This study addresses the need for a parent education program for divorcing and separating parents in the Latino community. It is intended to identify special needs and issues that may affect the implementation of such a program and proposes a framework as to how such issues might be addressed and met. This study is based on the implementation of the PEACE (Parent Education and Custody Effectiveness) program, an existing parent education program in New York State. This study will explore how the program may need to be adapted or modified to serve adequately and effectively the Latino community.     

L'Italie — Le Bicaméralisme Imparfait: Du Sénat du Royaume au Sénat de la République

Summary

Imperfect Bicameralism: Italy from the Senate of the Monarchy to the Senate of the Republic

1. The creation of the royal Senate; 2. The Italian antecedents of the 1848 Senate; 3. Projects for the reform of the Senate; 4. G. Mosca: the eulogy of imperfect bicameralism; 5. The end of the royal Senate and the birth of the republican Senate; 6. The current debate on bicameralism in Italy.     

Power transitions and the rise of the regulatory state: Global market governance in flux

This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule-takers to rule-makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT-GEG), which extends the scope of traditional power transition theory to conflict and cooperation in the international political economy and global regulatory governance. PTT-GEG emphasizes variation in the institutional strength of the regulatory state as the key conduit through which the growing market size of the emergent economies gives their governments leverage in global regulatory regimes. Whether or not a particular rising power, for a particular regulatory issue, invests its resources in building a strong regulatory state, however, is a political choice, requiring an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international politics that fuels or inhibits the creation of regulatory capacity and capability. PTT-GEG further emphasizes variation in the extent to which rising powers' substantive, policy-specific preferences diverge from the established powers' preferences as enshrined in the regulatory status quo. Divergence should not be assumed as given. Distinct combinations of these two variables yield, for each regulatory regime, distinct theoretical expectations about how the power transition in the world economy will affect global economic governance, helping us identify the conditions under which rule-takers will become regime-transforming rule-makers, regime-undermining rule-breakers, resentful rule-fakers, or regime-strengthening rule-promoters, as well as the conditions under which they remain weakly regime-supporting rule-takers.     

India,Brazil, and public health: Rule-making through south–south diffusion in the intellectual property rights regime?

This article analyzes the domestic drivers of regulatory state formation in India and Brazil and its consequences for the global rules governing pharmaceutical patents. We first analyze Indian and Brazilian politics of regulatory state formation; then, in light of the extent to which the two countries have built regulatory capacity and capability in the field of patent regulation, we explore whether and how they have been able to influence the existing intellectual property regime in health. We look into India's Section 3(d) and Brazil's prior consent requirement. Whereas India's Section 3(d) regulation has gained international regulatory influence by diffusing to other developing countries, the same cannot be said for Brazil's prior consent regulation, which has been caught by policy-reversals. The transition toward regulatory states in emerging countries is a bulky road and does not progress in linear ways. However, once regulatory capacity and capability have been solidified, domestic policy innovations can become internationally influential.     

The Georgian Church

The Georgian Orthodox Church is guided by the striving to embody the unity of the nation, but it constantly comes up against the diversity of society.     

Building assets to reduce vulnerability: microfinance provision by a rural working people's union in Mexico

Proyecto Tequisquiapan (PT) provides protective microfinance services in a small region of rural Mexico, including, importantly, open access to deposit facilities. The authors report on new research which examined PT's record in enabling people with different degrees of vulnerability to build assets and protect themselves from both sudden shocks and more predictable demands for lump sums of cash. Proyecto Tequisquiapan was found to be relatively more useful for the most vulnerable households. Its successes rely on its small scale and on the commitment of its staff, whose salaries are subsidised, to innovation and experimentation in order to remain relevant to members' changing and differentiated financial lifeworlds. This stands in contrast to the current trend towards large‐scale commercialised microfinance. The World Bank, the authors argue, should take note.     

Piophila megastigmata (Diptera: Piophilidae): first records on human corpses

Piophila megastigmata McAlpine, 1978, for many years only known from South Africa, was recently recorded in Spain. The present work reports for the first time the occurrence of P. megastigmata in human corpses in Portugal. The species was also collected in succession studies conducted with piglet carcasses, where it coexisted with Stearibia nigriceps (Meigen, 1826), showing similar periods of presence in the carcass. However, P. megastigmata was more abundant than S. nigriceps in autumn, with the opposite in summer. During winter neither species was able to colonize carrion and in spring, only S. nigriceps. This first record of P. megastigmata in human corpses confirms it as a potentially useful forensic species in Europe. The species, well established in the Iberian Peninsula, probably has a wider distribution but has been previously overlooked and possibly confused with Piophila casei (Linnaeus, 1758) in many studies.     

Capturing the Cali cartel: Selections from Jaque Mate

The Colombian National Policedismantled the Cali cartel through thedevelopment of a new style of intelligence,the assiduous use of informants, theemployment of modern technology, and zerotolerance of corruption within the force.In the course of several months in 1995,the key members of the organization werearrested, including Jorge Elicier, GilbertoRodriguez Orejuela, and Jose SantacruzLondono. Good luck and US assistance alsocontributed to the success of overalloperation.     

The new architects: Brazil,China, and innovation in multilateral development lending

Recent academic works have shed light upon the motives and negotiation dynamics leading to the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). We know less about their day‐to‐day activities and if (and if so why) they are being innovative in the field of multilateral development lending. This article evaluates novelty in the two banks. It uncovers and suggests an explanation to the puzzle of why the NDB appears more innovative (in terms of institutional design, staffing, and lending policy guidelines) than the AIIB by exploring the cases of China and Brazil. The two countries played central roles in the set‐up of each the AIIB and NDB. Drawing on extensive field research, the article proposes that their preferences and capability to engage in institutional innovation depend on interests, status, economic power, and regulatory capacity.