Changes in surveillance of regulatory enforcement progragrammes in Singapore

In recent years Myanmar underwent drastic political changes. While many see these changes as first tentative steps towards democratization, we argue that the current political transformation is not a deliberate process of liberalization, but a survival strategy of the military regime. Using arguments of the ‘new institutionalism’ as a theoretical foundation, this article explores the hypothesis that the high degree of professionalization of the Burmese military creates the incentive to institutionalize power-sharing among the ruling elite. Our empirical analysis finds evidence for both a highly professionalized military and institutions that by securing the military's continuing dominance serve the purpose of institutionalizing military power- sharing. These results imply that further democratization is unlikely as it must be initiated from within the still dominating military itself.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Sammelbesprechung:</Emphasis> Demokratie in Ostasien

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Sammelbesprechung: Demokratie in Ostasien

     

How fair is pricing perceived to be? An empirical study

The perceived fairness of different rules for allocating scarce resources is analysed in two cases: seats on a high speed train and parking spaces in a company car park. Attitudes toward allocation rules depend on context. They vary according to: the educational level of respondents; the type of “good”; and the exceptional or recurring nature of scarcity. Peak pricing, administrative and lottery rules are seen as the most unfair, together with queuing in some cases. The moral rule is considered to be the fairest one, except by more educated people who prefer the compensation rule.     

The Perils and Promises of Democratization through United Nations Transitional Authority – Lessons from Cambodia and East Timor

This article compares democratization under the aegis of the United Nations in Cambodia and East Timor. The analysis points to the inherent contradictions and problems of democratization in post-conflict situations and discusses the difficult issue of timing. It draws four generalized conclusions about democratization through international interim governments in post-conflict societies. First, UN-led interim governments can provide a solution to the problems of civil strife, insecurity, and political instability in disrupted states. Second, democratization through international interim governments in civil-war countries can be successful if the transitional authority is able to maintain a stable ‘hurting balance of power’ and to guarantee the parties' compliance with democratic procedures. Third, international interim regimes like UNTAC are designed on the premise that reconciliation among the domestic parties is possible. If the premise turns out to be inaccurate, the very foundation of the peace process is challenged and it will be almost impossible successfully to adjust the interim government's institutional structure. Fourth, the cases of Cambodia and East Timor demonstrate that democratization must be embedded in a comprehensive agenda of political, social, and economic methods of peace-building. If interim governments end before the roots of democracy are deep enough and before democratic institutions are strong enough to stand alone, then the entire endeavour may fail.     

Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies

It is consensus in the democratization literature that civilian control of the military is a necessary ingredient for democracy and democratic consolidation. However, there is considerable disagreement on what civilian control of the military exactly entails and there is a lack of solid theoretical arguments for how weak or absent civilian control affects democratic governance. Furthermore, a considerable portion of the research literature is captured by the fallacy of coup-ism, ignoring the many other forms in which military officers can constrain the authority of democratically elected political leaders to make political decisions and get them implemented. This article addresses these lacunae by providing a new conceptual framework for the analysis of civil–military relations in emerging democracies. From democracy theory it derives a definition of civilian control as a certain distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers. Based on this definition, the authors develop a five-dimensional concept of civilian control, discuss the effects of weakly institutionalized civilian control on the quality of democracy and address the chances for democratic consolidation.     

Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien

The last quarter of the 20^th century saw the worldwide advance of democracy. However, almost three decades after the beginning of the third wave of democratization, the empirical evidence increasingly suggests that this wave could become less a triumph of political liberalism and much more a success story for a “defective” form of democracy. The mainstream of theoretical and empirical ‘consolidology’ speaks of democracies and autocracies. This crude dichotomy does not allow for more differentiated judgments and conceptualizations of the structural and functional elements of this regime-type that has developed in the grey area between consolidated, liberal democracy and open autocracy. Thus far, a theoretical concept enabling the new regime-type to be systematically differentiated from democracies based on the rule of law, the reasons for its emergence to be clearly set out, and the specific dynamics of its development to be explained, has thus far been lacking. To overcome this shortcomings this article presents a multidimensional concept of democracy that allows, to distinguish between liberal democracies based on the rule of law and defective, or illiberal, democracies. From developing a three-dimensional typology for classifying three subtypes of defective democracies (exclusive democracy, tutelary democracy, illiberal democracy), the paper is focused on the illiberal democracy, more specifically on the questions what are the defining characteristics of illiberal democracies, and what are the reasons for their emergence. We will examine the specific interdependence of formal institutions and informal institutional arrangements, which we consider to be one of the central features of illiberal democracies and, finally, we will outline possible scenarios for the future development of illiberal democracies.     

Legislative powers,veto players,and the emergence of delegative democracy: A comparison of presidentialism in the Philippines and South Korea

This article integrates institutional and rational choice approaches to policy making to explain the emergence of delegative democracy in presidential systems. Delegative democracy, in essence, is a polyarchy which violates the rules and norms that secure the checks on the effective political power of democratically elected presidents at the horizontal level of the relations of the executive, legislature and judiciary. The article argues that delegative democracy is the result of the interaction of two variables: the strength and types of presidents' legislative powers and the configuration of institutional and partisan veto players. Strong, proactive legislative powers and weak veto players permit presidents to establish a delegative democracy; weak, reactive legislative powers and strong veto players hamper the emergence of delegative democracy. This general assumption explains why presidentialism in South Korea and in the Philippines developed in different directions in the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis shows that in case of moderate legislative powers of the president, the number, coherence and ideological distance of partisan veto players becomes particularly important. It suggests that studies of democratic regimes should give special emphasis to the rules regulating the distribution of legislative powers between presidents and parliaments and the configuration of veto players.