Environmental liability reform and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe

The legacy of severe environmental degradation inherited by the new Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies requires liability reform to aid the cleanup of existing pollution sources and create incentives for future environmental risk reduction. The paper analyzes a host of liability approaches to meet these goals, given economic and institutional characteristics specific to the CEE nations, and explores the impact of environmental liability rules on privatization and foreign investment. A principal conclusion of the analysis is that, for a host of efficiency-based reasons, liability should not be retroactively applied to the new owners of privatized firms. Also, the paper advocates the use of national liability funds to finance the cost of existing liabilities, while highlighting dangers associated with their use. In addition to the desirability of alternative privatization mechanisms, the paper also analyzes altemative liability rules to govern prospective environmental hazards.     

Punishing corporate criminals with restraint

This article is a revised version of a paper originally written for, and presented at, the eighth international conference of the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, Hong Kong, December 4–8, 1994. Parts have been published in Don Stuart,Canadian Criminal Law 575-91 (3d ed. 1995).     

The R and D contract and democratic theory

The purposes of this essay are to describe how federal research and development policy has altered authority relationships and to suggest a new concept of legitimacy in accord with the changed conditions. Research and development (R and D) creates an indeterminate future. Thus, the politics of research and development incorporates an apparent contradiction : political leadership demands that jobs be done which require creative and unpredictable actions on the part of private organizations, while it also demands that contractors be held responsible for fulfilling goals efficiently, avoiding deleterious secondary consequences, and refraining from abuses of power. The paradox can be resolved by creating norms of responsibility that allow for judgments on how a job is done rather than what is to be done. New institutions for technological assessment to check on unintended consequences of projects and citizen review boards to estimate the quality of life engendered by projects may provide such norms of responsibility.     

Local planners — global constraints

A number of reports have been published over the past few years documenting the evidence of decline in the northeastern U.S.A. and the simultaneous migration of industry to the U.S. Sunbelt. (Academy for Contemporary Problems, 1977; Sale, 1975; Sternlieb and Hughes, 1975). In developing appropriate recommendations to planners, such studies invariably urge that localities or regions facing industrial out-migration arrest this activity by making themselves more suitable and attractive (Council for Northeast Economic Action [CNEA], 1977a) within the framework of a number of characteristic strategies. We propose to examine critically some of the traditional strategies recommended by these reports.     

Competition in political and economic markets

Prepared as a response to Frey and Eichenberger's Anomalies in Political Economy. We thank Gordon Tullock for helpful discussions. This work was partially supported by the Taylor Experimental Laboratory at Washington University.