UNESCO,world heritage and the gridlock over Yemen

Abstract

Since March 2015, the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen has had devastating consequences for the country, its people and its rich cultural heritage. This article traces the responses of the world’s foremost multilateral body concerned with heritage promotion and protection, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Drawing on extensive interviews, archival research and long-term ethnographic research on UNESCO itself and, more specifically, its responses to the war in Yemen, it documents UNESCO’s profound failures in protecting Yemen’s heritage and in confronting the Saudi-led coalition. To do so, the article utilises the framework of ‘gridlock’ to analyse how and why multilateral bodies such as UNESCO become hamstrung in confronting powerful member states in conflict. The article concludes by arguing that UNESCO’s failures in Yemen hold powerful lessons about the role of multilateral institutions in addressing conflict.     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

The Economics of the “Final Solution”*

The economics of the Holocaust is a many‐facetted subject that is an integral part of the Holocaust's history. This paper describes some of the results of the new research since 1990 and discusses the economic rationalities employed by the perpetrators in despoiling the Jews. Economic considerations accompanied the timing and pace of the expropriation of Jewish assets and their “Aryanization.” The new research also shows that there was widespread collaboration in the expropriation of the Jews by private interests both inside Germany and in German‐controlled Europe and that networks of bureaucrats and private interests joined to achieve Nazi goals. The combination of expropriation and mass murder was one of the aspects of the Holocaust that made it unique.     

Are Monetary Unions Inevitable?

With the rapid growth of cross-border competition among currencies, informed observers predict that the new monetary unions are virtually inevitable in many parts of the world. In fact, predictions of such alliances are misleading and almost certainly wrong. Monetary unions necessarily imply a measure of collective action in the issue and management of money. An alliance requires allies—other states with similar preferences and a disposition to act cooperatively. A survey of proposed monetary unions shows that willing partners among sovereign states are just not all that plentiful. Conceivably some governments could be attracted to less demanding forms of monetary alliance, depending on bargaining context. But prospects for many full new monetary unions are dim at best.