Procedural Justice,Outcome Favorability and Emotion

This study investigated the effects of procedural justice on discrete emotional responses. Based upon the cognitive appraisal model of emotion, it was argued that the experience of procedural justice (or injustice) allows individuals to derive meaning from favorable and unfavorable allocation decisions. Thus, procedural justice works with outcome favorability to produce a variety of emotional states. These ideas were tested in a laboratory experiment. As predicted, two happiness-related emotions (happiness and joy) and a sadness-related emotion (disappointment) showed only a main effect for outcome favorability. Two anger-related emotions (anger and frustration) were highest when an unfavorable outcome occurred because of an unfair procedure. Higher levels of guilt and anxiety were reported when an unfair procedure resulted in a favorable outcome. Contrary to predictions, a third happiness-related emotion (pride) showed only a main effect for outcome favorability.     

Constituency characteristics and legislative preferences

An important concern for testing any theory of legislative politics is how to measure legislative preferences. No existing measures are immune to criticism, so sound advice should be based on a balanced assessment of various types of measures. This study focuses on the ability of constituency characteristics to predict Senate roll call votes. Even in the best possible case, constituency-characteristic measures are shown to be deficient both absolutely and relative to supposedly crude, vote-based measures which as ADA ratings. The implication is that constituency-characteristic measures are inappropriate as direct measures of legislative preferences. However, the possibility remains that for some applications they are useful indirect measures, e.g., as right hand side variables that covary with legislative behavior of interest.     

Parties in Elections, Parties in Government, and Partisan Bias

Adam Meirowitz Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: ameirowi{at}princeton.edu Thomas Romer Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: romer{at}princeton.edu Political parties are active when citizens choose among candidatesin elections and when winning candidates choose among policyalternatives in government. But the inextricably linked institutions,incentives, and behavior that determine these multistage choicesare substantively complex and analytically unwieldy, particularlyif modeled explicitly and considered in total, from citizenpreferences through government outcomes. To strike a balancebetween complexity and tractability, we modify standard spatialmodels of electoral competition and governmental policy-makingto study how components of partisanship—such as candidateplatform separation in elections, party ID-based voting, nationalpartisan tides, and party-disciplined behavior in the legislature—arerelated to policy outcomes. We define partisan bias as the distancebetween the following two points in a conventional choice space:the ideal point of the median voter in the median legislativedistrict and the policy outcome selected by the elected legislature.The study reveals that none of the party-in-electorate conditionsis capable of producing partisan bias independently. Specifiedcombinations of conditions, however, can significantly increasethe bias and/or the variance of policy outcomes, sometimes insubtle ways.     

The Politics of Judicial Procedures: The Role of Public Oral Hearings in the German Constitutional Court

Modern liberal democracies typically depend on courts with the power of constitutional review to ensure that elected officials do not breach their constitutional obligations. The efficacy of this review, however, can depend on the public observing such breaches. One resource available to many of the world's constitutional courts to influence the public's ability to do so is public oral hearings. Drawing on the comparative judicial literature on separation of powers, public awareness, and noncompliance, I develop a formal model of public oral hearings. The model provides empirical implications for when a court will hold public oral hearings and how hearings correspond to a court's willingness to rule against elected officials. An empirical analysis of hearings at the German Constitutional Court supports the model's prediction that courts use hearings as a resource to address potential noncompliance.     

The Coefficient of Party Influence

In a 2000 article in American Journal of Political Science,James Snyder and Tim Groseclose develop and apply an innovativemethod for detecting and estimating the frequency and magnitudeof party influence in congressional roll call voting. This paperpresents a framework for assessing the coefficient that theauthors interpret as "party influence." The analysis revealsthat, and shows why, the coefficient manifests two troublesomecharacteristics. The coefficient cannot discriminate betweendisparate types of party influence because the mapping betweentypes of partison influence and signs of the coefficient isnot one-to-one. Similarly, the coefficient has a responsivenessproblem because a marginal increase in one party's influencecan cause the estimate of the coefficient to increase, decrease,or remain constant. Because the literature on parties in Congressemphasizes majority-party strength, the inability of the coefficientto isolate party-specific effects is a serious drawback in theongoing hunt for genuine party discipline.     

Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game

A three-stage model isolates conditions under which an executive appointment to a collective choice body, such as a court or a regulatory agency, has an immediate bearing on policy. The model strikes a balance between previous formal models that predict either excessive gridlock or excessive policy responsiveness as a consequence of the politics of appointments. I test the model using approximately four decades of data on U.S. Supreme Court appointments. Two hypotheses summarize the unique predictions of the model and are strongly corroborated. A third, less distinctive hypothesis about strategic judicial retirements is weakly supported .     

Disseminated Neonatal Herpes Simplex Virus Infection with Escherichia Coli Coinfection

Neonatal herpes simplex virus (HSV) infection is an uncommon disease that rarely presents as sudden unexpected death of a previously healthy newborn. Clinical manifestations are variable; signs and symptoms may be subtle and nonspecific. Neonatal infection may present with mucocutaneous (skin, eye, and/or mouth), disseminated, or central nervous system disease. Morbidity and mortality are dependent upon disease presentation and treatment. The infection is most frequently transmitted during the peripartum period, although the majority of mothers have no known history of HSV infection at the time of delivery. Findings at autopsy include gastrointestinal or mucocutaneous ulcers, diffuse hepatic necrosis, adrenal necrosis, pneumonitis, and splenic necrosis. Characteristic intranuclear viral inclusions are identified on microscopic examination. Coinfection with bacterial organisms may contribute to death. Autopsy examination with appropriate ancillary studies, including cultures, is critical given that many infants lack cutaneous manifestations of disease and remain undiagnosed prior to death.     

Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World

Fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time. If left unattended, such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation. To better understand the mechanics of policy‐making in a changing world, we develop a positive theory that captures political drift in a dynamic separation‐of‐powers system. We show analytically that a distinctive combination of legislative supermajoritarianism and agency discretion—institutional features that, in isolation, elicit widespread criticism—can effectively ameliorate policies' susceptibility to the vicissitudes of exogenous change. The critical mechanism for governmental accommodation of drift is delegation, which increases all decision makers' well‐being by reducing fluctuations in outcomes. Although the complete smoothing of outcomes is attainable in a separation‐of‐ powers system, we show that this is typically not achieved in equilibrium. The presence of drift provides an opportunity for self‐interested legislators to extract a distributional benefit from their fellow legislators at the expense of overall policymaking efficiency.