A Kinder,Gentler Democracy? The Consensus Model and Swedish Disability Politics

Arend Lijphart's seminal consensus model of democracy does not only try to explain how democracy actually works. It also purports to be a ‘kinder, gentler’ form of democracy with regard to e.g. unemployment, disability, illness and old age. So far, this conjecture has not been brought to a systematic test which is the purpose of this article. We look into the consequences for one of the areas Lijphart singles out: disability. Does consensus democracy promote a more generous policy towards disabled people than majoritarian democracy? We transfer Lijphart's theory to municipality level. In Sweden, disability care is namely the responsibility for the municipalities, which are comparatively large and independent and with the right to tax their citizens; they are like small nation‐states. There is, however, a considerable variation in disability support between them. Some give ten times as much support than others. Is it those governed according to the consensus model? Our approach helps controlling for the variation in political and cultural context and expands the number of observations. The statistical comparison of Swedish municipalities does not, however, lend any confirmation of the famous theory. Instead, there are reasons to doubt that consensus democracy promotes more generous policies.     

The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk

The existing literature does not agree on the optimal jury size. We demonstrate that the probability of type I and type II errors is not sensitive to the number of jurors under the following three conditions: jurors receive independent signals about a defendant’s guilt during the evidence stage of the trial; the jurors truthfully reveal their signals before deliberations begin through their votes on the first ballot; and the jury’s deliberation follows a random walk. Since the opportunity cost of jury service is positive, this implies an optimal jury size of one.     

The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards

We argue that partisan elected judges have an incentive to redistributewealth from out-of-state defendants (nonvoters) to in-stateplaintiffs (voters). We first test the hypothesis by using cross-statedata. We find a significant partisan effect after controllingfor differences in injuries, state incomes, poverty levels,selection effects, and other factors. One difference that appearsdifficult to control for is that each state has its own tortlaw. In cases involving citizens of different states, federaljudges decide disputes by using state law. Using these diversity-of-citizenshipcases, we conclude that differences in awards are caused bydifferences in electoral systems, not by differences in statelaw.     

Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews: When Training to Detect Deception Works

Research on deception detection in legal contexts has neglected the question of how the use of evidence can affect deception detection accuracy. In this study, police trainees (N=82) either were or were not trained in strategically using the evidence when interviewing lying or truth telling mock suspects (N=82). The trainees’ strategies as well as liars’ and truth tellers’ counter-strategies were analyzed. Trained interviewers applied different strategies than did untrained. As a consequence of this, liars interviewed by trained interviewers were more inconsistent with the evidence compared to liars interviewed by untrained interviewers. Trained interviewers created and utilized the statement-evidence consistency cue, and obtained a considerably higher deception detection accuracy rate (85.4%) than untrained interviewers (56.1%).     

Glaubwürdigkeit als religiöses Vermögen

On the basis of quantitative data from household surveys in three Bosnian-Herzegovinian cities, I construct a revised model of the religious field according to Weber’s, Yinger’s and especially Bourdieu’s theories of religion, in order to analyze various religious organizations sociotopologically according to the criteria of credibility (Glaubwürdigkeit) and complexity (Organisiertheit). The purpose of the model is to determine religious power structures within a given regional context—especially in post-conflict situations, transitional states, and under conditions of precarious governance in general—taxonomically, and to provide grounds for in-depth qualitative research.     

Situational variables or beliefs? A multifaceted approach to understanding blame attributions

Are victim and perpetrator blame attributions affected more by situational-specific variables or observers’ basic motives and personal beliefs? In three experiments, varying the scenario setting, the effects of victim and participant age, participant gender, sympathy for the victim, trust in the justice system, belief in a just world and acceptance of rape myths were investigated. In total, 877 Swedish adolescents and adults read scenarios reflecting common acquaintance rape situations. Victim age (18 or 31) was manipulated, but did not affect attributed blame. Effects of participant age and gender varied markedly across the three experiments. Sympathy for the victim and acceptance of rape myths were stronger predictors than belief in a just world. Consistently, blame attributions were found to be more affected by personal beliefs than situational-specific variables.