Worlds of compliance: Why leading approaches to European Union implementation are only 'sometimes-true theories'

Abstract.  This article summarises the main theoretical findings of a large-scale qualitative project on the transposition, enforcement and application of six European Union labour law Directives in 15 Member States. Focusing on the transposition stage, its argument starts from a theoretical puzzle: When confronting the empirical results from the 91 cases covered in the article with the various hypotheses derived from the literature, it turns out that all causal conditions suggested by existing theories, and even two of the most prominent hypotheses (on misfit and veto players), have at best rather weak explanatory power. On closer inspection, these qualitative studies show that even their basic rationale does not hold in some groups of countries. As a solution, this article offers a typology of three worlds of compliance, each of which is characterised by an ideal-typical transposition style: a 'world of law observance', a 'world of domestic politics' and a 'world of transposition neglect'. This typology provides the key to understanding when and how individual theoretical propositions are relevant.     

Expediting Permanency through Community Decision‐Making

Permanency for children has taken on a renewed urgency since passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. This article describes the process of building a community approach to using alternative dispute resolution for expediting permanency, and reports on the initiative's progress to date. Expediting Permanency through Community Decision‐Making, a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services‐funded demonstration project, is simultaneously building community collaboration around the specific issue of permanency and establishing alternative dispute resolution models as a key component of permanency planning services. Lessons learned from implementation are instructive for others embarking on a community response to the demands of ASFA.     

Social status,political priorities and unequal representation

Researchers on inequalities in representation debate about whether governments represent the preferences of the rich better than those of less affluent citizens. We argue that problems of high- and low-status citizens are treated differently already at the agenda-setting stage. If affluent and less affluent citizens have different priorities about which issues should be tackled by government, then these divergent group priorities explain why government favours high- over low-status citizens. Due to different levels of visibility, resources and social ties, governments pay more attention to what high-status citizens consider important in their legislative agenda and pay less attention to the issues of low-status citizens. We combined three types of data for our research design. First, we extracted the policy priorities (most important issues) for all status groups from Eurobarometer data between 2002 and 2016 for 10 European countries and matched this information with data on policy outcomes from the Comparative Agendas Project. We then strengthen our results using a focused comparison of three single country studies over longer time series. We show that a priority gap exists and has representational consequences. Our analysis has important implications for the understanding of the unequal representation of status groups as it sheds light on an important, yet so far unexplored, aspect of the political process. Since the misrepresentation of political agendas occurs at the very beginning of the policy-making process, the consequences are potentially even more severe than for the unequal treatment of preferences.     

The three stages of the anti-incumbency vote: Retrospective economic voting in young and established democracies

Economic prosperity is the best recipe for an incumbent government to be re-elected. However, the financial crisis was significantly more consequential for governing parties in young rather than in established democracies. This article introduces the age of democracy as a contextual explanation which moderates the degree to which citizens vote retrospectively. It shows a curvilinear effect of the age of democracy on retrospective economic voting. In a first stage after the transition to democracy, reform governments suffer from a general anti-incumbency effect, unrelated to economic performance. In a second step, citizens in young democracies relate the legitimacy of democratic actors to their economic performance rather than to procedural rules, and connect economic outcomes closely to incumbent support. As democracies mature, actors profit from a reservoir of legitimacy, and retrospective voting declines. Empirically, these hypotheses are corroborated by data on vote change and economic performance in 59 democracies worldwide, over 25 years.     

Much ado about money and how to spend it! Analysing 40 years of annulment cases against the European Union Commission

This article analyses four decades of annulment cases against the European Commission brought before the European Court of Justice by dissatisfied Member States. Annulment cases are interpreted as incidents of a struggle between Member State governments and the Commission about policy decisions. Studying annulment cases for the first time in comparative perspective, three important patterns of variation are identified: with respect to the evolution of annulment cases over time, as regards the Member States as plaintiffs and in view of policy fields. Subsequently the data are interpreted on the basis of structure, agency and policy field specific explanatory mechanisms. Leaving the aggregate level, the two policy areas that account for more than 80 per cent of annulments are analysed: EU agriculture and competition policy. In the vast majority of cases, the dominant rationale behind annulments is not national objections to the supranational exercise of delegated powers per se or in specific policies (as most structural theories would expect) but to the way the Commission uses these competences to restrict how national governments may allocate European or national funding.