Plurality versus proportional representation: An analysis of Sicilian elections

The competing merits of plurality and proportional representation have intrigued political economists and political scientists for quite some time. Of primary interest is whether one or the other system is better in serving the interests of the electorate. Since theoreticians are unable to unambiguously determine the answer to this question, the issue must ultimately be decided empirically. We use data from Sicilian elections, where the system was recently altered towards the system of plurality. We are able to demonstrate that the proportional representation system engenders greater information among voters and elicits greater commitment from them than plurality. We are also able to show that in larger towns increased information causes a more dispersed vote under a proportional representation system; further, this result does not hold under plurality. This may have some implications for the size of positional rents reaped by political parties under the two electoral systems.     

The strategic behavior of the Italian Left in a risk-sharing framework

The failure of the communist systems in Eastern Europe, the collapse of two of the main Italian political parties due to their massive involvement in the corruption scandal which exploded in the early 1990s, and the change of the electoral system from proportional representation to plurality, caused a major revolution in the Italian political landscape. Within this scenario old and new parties have been shaping their electoral and political strategies. In this paper our primary interest is to demonstrate that the apparently divergent policies supported by the two main parties of the Italian Left could hide a probable electoral strategy to grab the moderate Italian electorate and, hence, to capture the governing majority necessary to rule the country. This will be done through an economic model of risk-sharing applied to plurality maximizer parties.     

Death Due to Decapitation in Two Motorcyclists: A Description of a Unique Case and a Brief Review of the Literature

Deaths due to decapitation, especially related to traffic accidents, are rarely found in forensic practice. The present case involves a man and a woman who died from decapitation due to an unusual mechanism while they were riding on a motorbike down a mountain road. The autopsy, which was completed as a physics study, allowed the accident to be reconstructed as follows: A plastic cable that had detached from a timber‐transporting machine whipped the road and hit the two motorcyclists. The impact resulted in the complete severing of both riders’ heads. Involving different scientists in this accident investigation was crucial to understanding the dynamics of the accident. In fact, in addition to scene inspection and autopsy, a physics study was carried out on the cable and the clamp involved, which led to an explanation for the abrupt movement of the cable and, thus, to a thorough reconstruction of the accident.     

Local Pork-Barrel Politics in National Pre-Election Dates: The Case of Italy

Political representation in the national assemblies isgeographic and elected representatives care about whogains and who loses in their electoral districts. Since legislators are re-election oriented, theirchances of electoral success are directly associatedwith the net benefits delivered to their constituents. In this perspective, geography is not only the basisfor political organisation and representation, butalso the hallmark of distributive politics. In thiscontext, it is likely that locally elected politiciansand party leaders standing in national elections wouldtend to cooperate in pre-election dates. In thispaper we argue that local administrators have anincentive to manipulate local government outlays inconnection with national election dates to enhance there-election prospects of their national party leaders. In particular, given the matching character ofnational grants with local investment spending, weexpect that in pre-election dates local policy-makerswould be induced to raise investment outlays beyondtheir standard growth rate. This would determineinefficient local public spending as a result of thegeographically-based system of democraticrepresentation. The case study under our investigationis the behaviour of Italian local policy-makers inconnection with national election dates.     

Voter information and power dilution: Evidence from Sicilian provincial elections

Public Choice - It is generally accepted that an increase in the amount of voter information is desirable. As Reisman (1990) points out, a well-informed and committed electorate is better able to...     

History and Institutions in the Rebuilding of Social Capital after Forced Resettlement in the Philippines and Indonesia

Resettlement results in the loss of social capital from which poor households can draw resources for sustenance, survival and wellbeing. While Putnam deems social capital formation as pre-determined by a community’s history of civic engagement, the institutional view argues that social capital is generated through the institutions’ interventions. Utilising a comparative approach involving two resettlement sites, one in the Philippines and one in Indonesia, this article presents findings on the explanatory power of these two perspectives. The Philippine case is greatly influenced by the institutional interventions while the Indonesian case testifies to the validity of the theoretical perspective of Putnam.     

Institutions and Market Reform in Emerging Economies: A Rent Seeking Perspective

The role of institutions as determinants ofrent seeking success is well established. In this paper, we focus on institutionsthat have received little attention in theliterature, namely electoral institutions. We examine three measures of electoralinstitutional structure that arehypothesized to be instrumental indetermining the level of rent seekingsuccess. These are the type of electoralsystem, pluralistic or proportional; methodof selection of the chief executive,presidential or parliamentary; and thenumber of electoral districts. An index ofeconomic freedom is used as the metric forrent seeking opportunities created bygovernments. Theoretical implications ofvariation in these electoral institutionsare developed. These implications areempirically tested employing data from 29countries classified as having emergingmarket economies. Countries with emergingeconomies are expected to exhibit moreinstitutional flexibility that moredeveloped countries whose property rightsare well established and defended. Theempirical results are controlled fordifferences in a number of demographic andhistorical factors. Plurality electoralsystems are more resistant to the politicaldemands of rent seeking than proportionalsystems. Fewer election districts seem toreduce rent seeking opportunities. However, conditional on the type ofelectoral system, presidential systems arefound to be no more resistant to rentseeking than parliamentary systems. Finally, we find strong control effects. Literacy increases a country's resistanceto rent seeking while military spending andyears of institutional entrenchment reduceit.