A mixed DNA profile controversy revisited

Semaan et al. (J Forensic Res, 2020, 11, 453) discuss a mock case “where eight different individuals [P₁ through P₈] could not be excluded in a mixed DNA analysis. Even though … expert DNA mixture analysis software was used.” Two of these are the true donors. The LRs reported are incorrect due to the incorrect entry of propositions into LRmix Studio. This forced the software to account for most of the alleles as drop-in, resulting in LRs 60–70 orders of magnitude larger than expected. P₁, P₂, P₄, P₅, and P₈ can be manually excluded using peak heights. This has relevance when using LRmix which does not use peak heights. We extend the work using the same two reference genotypes who were the true contributors as Semaan et al. (J Forensic Res, 2020, 11, 453). We simulate three two-donor mixtures with peak heights using these two genotypes and analyze using STRmix?. For the simulated 1:1 mixture, one of the non-donors’ LRs supported him being a contributor when no conditioning was used. When considered in combination with any other potential donors (i.e., with conditioning), this non-donor was correctly eliminated. For the 3:1 mixture, all results correctly supported that the non-donors were not contributors. The low-template 4:1 mixture LRs with no conditioning showed support for all eight profiles as donors. However, the results from pair-wise conditioning showed that only the two ground truth donors had LRs supporting that they were contributors to the mixture. We recommend the use of peak heights and conditioning profiles, as this allows better sensitivity and specificity even when the persons share many alleles.     

Defense Industries and Global Dependency

The global defense industrial sector is a remarkably accurate indicator of the distribution of power in the post-Cold War international system. However, the defense industrial sector as a policy tool has received relatively little scrutiny, even though it not only reflects the international order, but also provides the United States with the ability to influence the foreign policy behavior of other states. The defense industrial sector is a powerful, if undervalued, diplomatic tool in the United States’ political arsenal.     

Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England and Wales

Professions are granted a form of cartel that enables them to charge more than would arise in a free market on the assumption that they provide better quality and are more trustworthy than free-market actors would be. The theoretical assumption that lawyers are more competent than nonlawyers has given rise to significant formal protections for professions in many jurisdictions. Two testable propositions arise from this theory: (1) lawyers cost more, but (2) they deliver higher quality. It is a testing of these twin propositions that is the subject of this article, with well-triangulated data and a deeper understanding of the theoretical differences between lawyers and nonlawyers.     

REACH: A Step Change in the Management of Chemicals

The EU has regulated chemicals since the late 1960s using both general and sectoral legislation, and exposure-based, hazard-based and risk-based decisions. A new proposal from the European Commission – on the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) – will build on the experiences of the existing legislation and introduce some new concepts in the management of chemicals. This article is aimed at assessing the current chemical control mechanisms in the EU and those put forward in REACH to demonstrate how REACH is a new paradigm in chemicals management. REACH will carry forward today's experience and approach to the management of chemicals in the EU and introduces some novel aspects, such as utilizing market-based mechanisms and putting into operation the 'substitution principle'.     

RICO: The genesis of an idea

In 1970, the Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. Title IX of the 1970 Act is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. This Act had its origins in legislation going back as far as 1934, but coming forward to 1961. The 1970 Act borrowed ideas from this earlier legislation, principally “enterprise,” but also the use predicate statutes to define “racketeering activity.” The ideas are not new, but their combination affects how prosecutors and law enforcement agents investigate, try, and sanction violations of the Act. RICO’s drafting also reflects organizational theory and economic analysis. The investigation and prosecution of a single crime committed by an individual on a single day and in a single place maybe done using one set of procedural and evidentiary rules. Nevertheless, the investigation and prosecution of patterns of diverse offenses committed by, through, and against licit and illicit enterprises require sophisticated procedures, evidentiary rules, and criminal sanctions. In addition, antisocial conduct is more than a challenge to the administration of criminal justice; it also requires the full panoply of civil sanctions, including public injunctions as well private enforcement of injunctive relief and treble damages. RICO has had a profound effect on the prosecution of organized crime, white-collar crime, and other forms of similar criminal behavior. William J. & Dorothy K. O’Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; A.B. 1957, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1960, Notre Dame Law School. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1969-70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-542, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) was processed, Title IX of which is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. For a general treatment of the statute from a variety of perceptive, see the collection of law review literature in G. Robert Blakey & Kevin Roddy, “Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning an Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding, Abetting and Conspiracy Liability under RICO,” 33 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 1345, 1348 n. 3(1996).