Two Complementary Settings of Peace-making Diplomacy: Political-Elite Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy

In terms of the question, “how to create an effective peace-making process in the Israeli–Palestinian case,” this article argues that the answer is a multidimensional approach to peace-making diplomacy that contains two main settings: political-elite diplomacy and public diplomacy. Political-elite diplomacy suggests various modes of peace-making interactions between political-elites. Public diplomacy provides instruments to involve the people in the peace-making struggle, prepares them for a change, and presses the leadership to reach agreements. The analysis suggests establishing an institution for the operation of public diplomacy—a major Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating congress. The congress is a democratic peace-making institution that invites representatives of the opposing societies to discuss, debate, and negotiate solutions to their struggle. The article also presents the concepts of political-elite diplomacy and public diplomacy as competitive settings that should be regarded as complementary. It includes lessons from the “Minds of Peace Experiment”—a small-scale Israeli–Palestinian public negotiating congress—which has been conducted in different places around the world.     

Die politischen Konsequenzen der niedrigen Wahlbeteiligung bei der Europawahl 2009

If electoral abstention is linked to party preferences, low turnout—as witnessed in European Parliament elections—may hurt some parties and benefit others. In order to assess this possibility, we compare, in the member states of the EU, parties’ vote shares in the 2009 European Parliament elections with the results that would have been obtained had turnout reached the level of national general elections. We find that the effects of low turnout are minimal, and that—except for a single seat—higher turnout would not have resulted in a different composition of the European Parliament.     

Against Prevention? A Response to Harcourt's Against Prediction on Actuarial and Clinical Predictions and the Faults of Incapacitation

This article reviews Bernard Harcourt's Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2007), in which he criticizes the use of actuarial prediction methods in the contexts of policing and sentencing. I focus on the latter context. I argue that Harcourt has identified an important, and not exclusively American, trend and develops a valid critique of it that should be pushed further. From a theory of punishment perspective, I argue that Harcourt's critique is no less applicable to clinical prediction methods than to the use of actuarial ones. Harcourt's arguments, however, beg a more general explanation of the flaws of incapacitation as a justification for punishment. If we base our objection to the use of prediction methods on such larger grounds, questions arise as to the legitimacy of other practices that are not considered punitive but rather "regulatory" or "preventive."     

Political Cycles,Fiscal Deficits,and Output Spillovers in Europe

This paper investigates whether national elections in Europegenerate political cycles in other European countries, and, ifso, whether these spillover effects are likely to surviveinside EMU. The paper first tests whether elections in Germanyaffect macroeconomic outcomes in other European countries andthen investigates the impact of elections on budget deficits.The results indicate that German politics significantlyimpacts macroeconomic variables in other European countries,and also that politics significantly affects the behaviour ofEuropean budgetary policy. The prospect of elections tends toincrease public deficits in recessions, whereas left-winggovernments tend to be more deficit-prone than right-winggovernments regardless of the state of the economy. Moreover,the existence of political cycles spillovers among Europeancountries suggest that there may be a need for electoralcoordination.