Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?

Individuals are the single largest source of campaign contributions, yet we know little about their motivations. For instance, the existing literature questions whether individual contributors sophisticatedly differentiate among candidates according to policy positions, particularly among same‐party candidates. We analyze this issue by combining data from a new survey of over 2,800 in‐ and out‐of‐state donors associated with the 2012 Senate elections, FEC data on contributors’ professions, and legislative records. Three major findings emerge. First, policy agreement between a donor's positions and a senator's roll calls significantly influences the likelihood of giving, even for same‐party contributors. Second, there is a significant effect of committee membership corresponding to a donor's occupation; this holds even for donors who claim that other motivations dominate, but it does not appear to be motivated by an expectation of access. Third, conditional upon a donation occurring, its size is determined by factors outside a legislator's control.     

To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity

Though many scholars study the formation of policy, less attention is given to its endurance. In this article, I seek to determine what contributes to the longevity of policy by examining the case of presidential unilateralism. While scholars widely recognize presidents’ ability to unilaterally make policy with executive orders, they largely do not account for how these same orders can be easily changed by subsequent administrations. To address this deficiency, I develop a theory of executive order duration based on both time‐invariant characteristics of the order and time‐variant changes in the political climate it faces. Using survival analysis to examine all orders revoked between 1937 and 2013, I find support for the theory. This study has implications for understanding the endurance of executive orders and other policy instruments as part of the law as well as understanding the strategic actions of policy makers given the transient nature of these tools.     

Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism

This article develops a theory of presidential unilateralism in which both ideological divergence with Congress and legislative capacity influence the president's use of executive orders. We argue that when Congress is less capable of constraining the executive, the president will issue more executive orders during periods of divided government. Conversely, in periods of high legislative capacity, the president is less likely to issue executive orders when faced with an opposed Congress. Based on an examination of institutional changes, we identify years prior to the mid‐1940s as characterized by low congressional capacity and the subsequent period as characterized by high capacity. Testing the theory between 1905 and 2013, we find strong support for these predictions and demonstrate that legislative capacity conditions the role of ideological disagreement in shaping presidential action. Overall, this article deepens our current understanding of the dynamics of separation‐of‐powers politics and the limits of executive power.     

Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems

Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateralism less often under divided government. While executives see greater potential policy gains through unilateral action during divided government, we argue that their likelihood of acting unilaterally depends on an opposed legislature's ability to retaliate. When polarization is high and majorities are marginal, executives are freer to act unilaterally given the difficulties legislatures have in statutorily responding. Unilateralism is also more likely when facing opposition if legislatures lack nonstatutory means of punishment, such as regulatory review. In the largest analysis of gubernatorial executive unilateralism to date, we use a new data set of 24,232 executive orders in the 50 American states between 1993 and 2013 to evaluate this argument and find strong support for its predictions. These results provide insights into how legislative policymaking capacity can influence the functioning of separation of powers systems.     

Understanding Suicide Across the Lifespan: A United States Perspective of Suicide Risk Factors,Assessment & Management

Suicide is a troubling, preventable phenomenon. Prior to attempts, individuals often seek help, prompting practitioners to perform risk assessments that ideally use evidence‐based risk management strategies. A literature review was performed using Harvard Countway Library of Medicine, Google Scholar, PubMed. Key words used were “Forensic Science,” “Suicide Risk Management,” “Pediatric Suicide Risk Factors,” “Adult Suicide Risk Factors,” “Geriatric Suicide Risk Factors,” “Suicide Risk Assessment.” Parameters limited articles to studies/reviews completed in the past twenty years in the United States. Results indicated predictors of suicide in juveniles were insomnia, burdensomeness, and recent conflicts with family or a romantic partner. Adults had greater risk if male, substance abusing, with marital/job loss. Elderly individuals with multiple medical comorbidities, hopelessness, and isolation were at higher risk. Everyone evaluated should be screened for access to firearms. Management of suicide risk involves providing the least restrictive form of treatment which maintains an individual's safety.