Tinpots,Totalitarians (and Democrats): An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Economic Growth on Civil Liberties and Political Rights

Ronald Wintrobe (1990, 1998) has recently provided atheoretical foundation for estimating equations that attemptto explain the dependence of civil liberties and politicalrights in non-democratic regimes on the history of economicgrowth. This theory suggests that data from different kinds ofnon-democratic countries should not be pooled without allowingcoefficients to vary with regime type. It also placesinteresting restrictions on the signs of the coefficients ofeconomic growth in equations explaining freedom in the typesof regimes Wintrobe identifies. In this paper, we employ theserestrictions to test Wintrobe's theory. Some additionalhypotheses about the difference between democratic andnon-democratic regimes and about the role of education, notconsidered by Wintrobe, are also investigated.The results indicate clearly that the relationship between thedegree of freedom – as measured by the sum of the Gastilindexes of civil liberties and political rights – andeconomic growth varies significantly across all types ofregimes. Totalitarians (that attempt to maximize power) areclearly different than tinpots (that just attempt to maintainpower) in this respect, and non-democratic regimes differ fromdemocracies. Other aspects of the theory are partiallyconfirmed. In particular, in totalitarian regimes, positivegrowth reduces freedom, and negative growth increases it insome specifications. The theory predicts the opposite patternfor tinpots, and we do find that negative growth reducesfreedom in tinpot regimes. However, positive growth in tinpotsalso appears to reduce freedom in some cases, which is not inaccord with the theory. Secondary schooling has a positive effect on freedom, as inprevious empirical work, a result that is shown here to holdeven when each type of regime is considered separately. Butthe effect of primary schooling is different: in tinpot andtotalitarian regimes, but not in democracies, primaryschooling is associated with reduced freedom.     

Trending economic factors and the structure of Congress in the growth of government, 1930–2002

We investigate the role of Congress in the growth of federal public expenditure since 1930, building on the work of Kau and Rubin (Public Choice, 113:389–402, 2002). The model incorporates majority party strength and the extent of party control of Congress in addition to the median ideological position of elected representatives. We first provide estimates of the relative importance of the state of Congress and of trending supply and demand-side economic factors in the evolution of federal spending. The resulting models are then used to simulate the consequences of the radical and historically unprecedented shift to the right of Congress in 1994/95.     

Sexual problems found in users of a student mental health clinic

The authors were interested in discovering the spectrum and prevalence of sexual problems among young adults. With this goal in mind, they devised a Sexual Problems Check List as a comprehensive instrument utilizable by both clinicians and researchers. The Sexual Problems Check List was derived by reviewing therapists' treatment summaries and 146 recent answers to applications written by patients themselves as the first step in applying for treatment at a university mental health clinic. Data were then obtained from 52 subsequent student mental health clinic patients; such patients were selected as the sample because they were late adolescents and young adults thought likely to exhibit a broad range of clinically significant probelms. General patterns of concerns were noted which indicated that the sexual revolution has not been as liberating as the respondents were led to believe.Received his M. D. from Yale University School of Medicine in 1963. Psychiatric Residency at Yale, 1964–1967. Main interests include psychiatry residency training, psychoanalytic study of peotry, student mental health.Receved his M.D. from the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia in 1971. Psychiatric Residency at University of Chicago, 1972–1975. Main interests include hospital psychiatry and group treatment for rheumatoid arthritis.Received his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Chicago in 1968. Main interests include urban problems, socialization, and deviance.     

Explaining variation in the competitiveness of U.S. Senate elections, 1922–2004

We develop and test predictions about the factors determining the competitiveness of elections to the U.S. Senate. To do so, we deliberately abstract away from candidate-specific conditions that have often been used to study political competitiveness in order to focus on basic structural features of the electoral landscape. In our framework, party-specific constraints on the ideological positioning of local candidates, linked to the national party organization and its contributors, interact with the heterogeneity of state electorates to determine the number of highly competitive Senate contests. Three hypotheses emerge from this model: (1) the greater the diversity of a party’s national legislative delegation, the more highly competitive Senate elections we will observe; (2) states in which the ideological heterogeneity of the electorate is relatively high will exhibit a greater number of highly competitive elections; and (3) highly competitive Senate contests will be more common in states with closed primaries than in states with open primaries. We provide strong evidence in support of the first two hypotheses and some evidence in support of the third.     

Political Influence,Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: With Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983

We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model ofa competitive political economy in which the economic interestsof groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibriumpolicy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP taxmodel, calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAPhouseholds into homogeneous groups affects the numericalrepresentation of interests and influence for representativemembers of each group.     

Studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons

Here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods. The approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the Government of Canada over 130 years. Political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size.