Contests of citizenship: A comment

The language of citizenship is one of authority, legitimation and contest. Citizenship rights were brought about in some parts of Europe through struggle and revolution, and even then excluded the masses and women. But the ‘law‐state’ and constitutions they established were the necessary conditions for subsequent struggles by these sectors for inclusion and ultimately for cultural and social citizenship. The advocacy of human rights is frequently denounced as ‘Western’ imposition of an individualism alien to other cultures, but these culturalist defences act as a cover for communitarian and state authoritarianism. The establishment of legal rights does not contradict social bonds, but can ensure reciprocity of obligations and protection from communal authority. This is specially pertinent for women. Social bonds are not peculiar to the ‘East’ or ‘South’, but are universal, including the mythical ‘West’, and legal rights for the individual are a necessary condition for achieving justice in social relations.     

Factionalism and political discourse in the Islamic Republic of Iran:The Case of the Hujjatiyeh Society

The revolutionary Islamic government of Iran is dominated by clerical forces organised for the most part in the Islamic Republic Party. After defeating and banishing its secular opponents, notably the first President of the Republic, Bani-Sadr, the clerical party and regime developed factional struggles within their ranks. The issue of these struggles is what we consider to be the central dilemma of the revolutionary regime: the radical, populist slogans and policies of the revolution vs. routinised government maintaining order and protecting property. Khomeini's doctrine of Wilayat-i-Faqih which required the politicisation of religion and the sacralisation of politics has become closely associated with revolutionary populism. The radical forces, self proclaimed Maktabis, have insistently defended the original principles and policies of the revolution in the name of Khomeini and his ‘Imam line’ against the forces which they claimed to be infiltrating the regime to subvert the revolution and restore capitalist-imperialist control. The Maktabis with the vocal support of the Tudeh (communist) party, identified subversive forces with the Hujjatiyeh, a shadowy society, apparently with close connections to the clerical establishment

We examine the attacks upon and the defences of the ‘Hujjatiyeh’ to distinguish the styles, discourses and directions of factional struggles in relation to the central conflict between populism and order     

The city and its ‘other’ in Islamic political ideas and movements

Historically, the city has been the natural habitat for innovations in political and religious ideas and the locus of politico-religious organization and associations. But the proximity to the centers of military power and of religious orthodoxy have rendered the social movements based on these ideas ineffective. The movements which led to political transformations come from marginal settlements and tribal organizations. Ideas and actions relating to location and habitat are examined briefly. Moving on to the modern period it isnoted that almost without exception Islamic political ideas related implicitly to an urban setting. In particular, we examine some of the political ideas of Sayyid Qutb which have been influential among more recent radical Islamic groups in Egypt. These relate to theformation of an Islamic vanguard, separating itself from the prevalent jahiliyya (state of error and ignorance) and, following the example of the early Muslims, fortified with faith, wage a jihad (holy war) to conquer this jahiliyya. Some implications of these ideas for urban social relations and for location and space are examined.     

The ideological conditions for Khomeini's doctrine of government ∗

The Islamic movements and ideologies labelled ‘Fundamentalist’ share an oppositional stance to their respective governments rather than common doctrinal positions. The Islamisation of society and the state is planned on the model of the ‘original’ Islamic community of Muhammad and his immediate successors, but the interpretation of their principles in relation to modern socio-political contexts gives rise to political ideologies which represent marked departures from traditional Islamic doctrines and incorporate implicity or explicity modern political concepts. Khomeini's doctrine of government is an interesting example in that it is entirely based on traditional Shi'ite, premises and modes of reasoning and yet it reaches novel conclusions. It is argued that these conclusions presuppose the modern ideological notions of ‘the nation’ and the ‘nation-state’.     

The ‘Arab Spring’ in the historical perspectives of Middle East politics

Abstract

The events of the ‘Arab Spring’ appeared to be animated by slogans and objectives of universalist orientations to liberty, dignity and social justice, a departure from the ethno-religious nationalisms that dominated the politics of the region. They raised questions regarding the ‘exceptionalism’ of Arabs and Muslims, whom many observers and commentators considered to be tied to sentiments and solidarities of patrimonialism, tribe and religion. Yet, the forces that seemed to benefit from the transformations in Egypt and elsewhere were not those that made the ‘revolution’ but precisely religious and patriarchal parties which benefited from popular constituencies in elections. A consideration of the political history of the main countries concerned can throw some light on these transformations. The nationalist, often military, regimes which emerged from the independence struggles of mid-twentieth century headed ideological, populist, nationalist and ‘socialist’ movements and parties and authoritarian regimes which eliminated oppositional politics and social autonomies in favour of a corporatist welfare state. These regimes, facing economic and geo-political contingencies of the later decades were transformed into dynastic oligarchies and crony capitalism which broke the compact of welfare and subsidies leading to intensified impoverishment and repression of their populations. Popular strata were driven ever more into reliance on ‘survival units’ of kin and community, reinforcing communal and religious attachments at the expense of civic and associational life. These ties and sentiments come to the fore when the ruling dynasties are displaced, as in Iraq after the 2003 invasion or Egypt after the removal of Mubarak. The ideological and universalist politics of the revolutionaries appear to be swamped by those conservative affiliations.