Bounded oligarchy: How and when factions constrain leaders in party position-taking

This work investigates the process of position-taking, focussing on the factional bargaining within the party. Exploiting two recently built datasets that estimated the policy positions of Italian parties and factions from 1946 to 2010, we investigate if and to what extent factions bind the party leader in choosing the platform. We find confirmation for the idea that party positions are linked to factional preferences. Overall, the party works as a ‘bounded oligarchy’. Furthermore, the electoral payoff of party unity increases the impact of factional constraints when general elections approach. In line with the cartel party theory, however, autonomous leaders who are directly elected by a wider selectorate can get rid of factional ties choosing more moderate and vote-maximizing platforms.     

论核心卡特尔中的宽恕制度及我国《反垄断法》对其规制和完善

核心卡特尔通过相同的定价、一致的行动、固定的份额来获取高额的利润,给竞争带来重大的危害,但是其隐蔽性强,难以为执法机关所侦破.宽恕制度,通过豁免卡特尔协议成员的方式以鼓励其对卡特尔协议的披露,成为西方国家打击卡特尔的重要武器.我国<反垄断法>虽对宽恕制度做了规制,但尚且不足.仍待完善.     

The Mining Industry and the State: The Politics of Tin Restriction in Bolivia, 1936–1939

In the aftermath of the Chaco War (1932–1935) a strong left nationalist political current emerged in Bolivia which defined the three large mining companies of Patiño, Hochschild and Aramayo as a superstate, controlling both the economy and the politics of the nation to their own advantage. This article challenges that characterisation by examining the way in which the state exercised control over the two largest producers. Unfortunately, the state lacked the technical capacity to use its powers responsibly, preventing the development of a coherent mining policy.     

On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis

In order to enhance the enforcement of Antitrust Law, leniency policies were introduced in nearly all industrialized countries. These programs aim at deterring and eliminating cartels. In this paper we analyze the rationale of the current European and German leniency regulation. We challenge the contemporary view that the standard leniency privilege is incentive-compatible with respect to its aim to enhance competition. Instead, we argue for it to be used as a preemptive strike against competitors under circumstances where cartels become unstable. This implies a tightening of markets in subsequent periods and, thus, a potential reduction in competition intensity. Given strategic reasoning by agents, the principal witness may assure an economically privileged position in the future. This consequence might not be intended by the bonus regulations. Nevertheless if the leniency policies lead to more competition in the market the results should be welcomed by the national cartel offices. We give anecdotal evidence of the German cement case and base our arguments on a game-theoretical model.

当代韩国政党政治民主化的变迁特征——以卡特尔政党理论为分析视角

1995年,欧洲学者凯茨和麦尔首先提出卡特尔政党的概念,同时总结了卡特尔政党在国家与社会中的地位转变所衍生出的特质。本文从政党与国家之间的联络、政党竞争环境和政党与市民社会之间的关系等几方面探讨韩国政党政治的一般情况。作者认为,卡特尔政党虽倡导民主与自由竞争,但实则关注操控权力的运用,此种情况无助于韩国政党的民主化进程。因此相关的制度设计是防止卡特尔政党对民主政治产生负面影响的必要措施。     

反垄断法宽恕制度的理论基础与实效保障

发源于美国反垄断法之宽恕制度,具有明显的依赖性、契约性和威慑性特征。由于该制度在反垄断执法中对于及时发现和查处秘密卡特尔发挥了重要作用,因此,被许多国家和地区反垄断法所参照,成为推动反垄断法有效实施的重要工具之一。坚实的经济学基础和法理学基础,是该制度合理性的依据所在,也是其功效得以发挥的重要基础;具体的适用条件、严厉的处罚措施、确定的减免待遇和诚实信用原则的遵守是其效力得以实现的重要保障。我国《反垄断法》虽然也引进了宽恕制度,但未设计具体有效的实效保障措施,应借鉴其他国家和地区的经验予以完善。     

欧盟卡特尔案件宽大制度及启示

欧盟宽大制度是一种减轻或免除卡特尔行为人罚款责任的制度。自1996年欧盟引入该项制度以来,现已历经2002年和2006年两次修改。现行宽大制度包括罚款全额免除和部分减免两方面：前者适用于最先提供可使欧盟委员会展开调查或发现违法行为证据的企业;后者适用于提供对欧盟委员会已掌握之证据具有显著附加价值证据的企业。同时,为保证宽大制度的有效实施,欧盟在宽大制度程序保障机制及规制机关自由裁量权控制等方面做出了完善规定。     

新疆公安机关基层领导心理健康现状调查分析

采用症状自评量表（SCL-90）、卡特尔16种人格因素测验对100名基层领导进行测评,并用惠诚心理测验软件系统5．0版进行分析统计。结果显示。公安机关基层领导心理健康状况良好,但因职业的特殊性也会出现不同程度的心理问题。组织人事部门应在重视基层领导干部的政治、思想、业务素质的同时,还应重视他们心理健康素质的培养。应采取提供心理健康服务、引导健康向上的兴趣和爱好、严格落实休假制度等有效措施,以提高公安机关基层领导的心理健康水平。增强队伍整体的战斗力。     

Money, organization and the state: The partial cartelization of party politics in Slovenia

A detailed analysis of party organization, party funding and voting behaviour in parliament in Slovenia indicates a partial cartelization of Slovene party politics. In line with the cartel thesis, parties in Slovenia are heavily dependent on the state for their finances and there is evidence that parties have used the resources of the state to limit competition. Nonetheless, there is much less evidence of cartelization in terms of party organization indicating more cartelization in the party system as a whole than within individual parties.