The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility

I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal).

相互制约:联盟管理的核心机制

内容提要:本文主要探讨联盟管理过程中盟友之间互动的动态机制。通过归纳和推理,笔者发现,联盟维持和管理的机制是相互制约,两个变量——盟友之间的权力对比和意图匹配程度——通过相互制约的核心机制影响联盟的命运。按权力对比,联盟可以区分为对称性联盟和非对称性联盟;按联盟内部的国家意图,联盟可以区分为防御性联盟和进攻性联盟。这样,将至少有四个"理想型"联盟,每一个"理想型"联盟都存在自身特有的互动动态。总的来说,在对称性联盟中,若盟友意图一致,则彼此相互制约易于成功,联盟容易管理;反之,则不易管理。在非对称性联盟中,只有当强国为防御性现实主义国家而弱国为进攻性现实主义国家时,相互制约才相对困难,联盟才较难管理。文章以第一次世界大战前的法俄联盟、20世纪中叶的中苏联盟以及20世纪50年代之后的美日联盟作为案例,对本文提出的联盟管理理论进行验证。     

Identifying intentions: Latvian policy-makers’ perceptions of Russia’s intentions

There is much disagreement on the specific aspects of behavior that are the most useful for estimating intentions of potential adversaries. One view is that military capabilities are the most useful. Alternative views consider that an adversary’s domestic politics, or symbolic-normative aspects of its behavior, contain valuable information for assessing its intentions. This article tests these three competing views on Latvia as a case study, based on in-depth interviews with 10 high-ranking decision-makers. The article concludes that although the interviewees regarded information on the potential adversary’s military capabilities to be crucial for inferring its intentions, other indicators were also regarded as important.