Governors-General during Pacific Island constitutional crises and the role of the Crown

Links with the Crown are often thought to play a largely ‘symbolic’ role in the contemporary politics of the Pacific Islands. Yet the Queen appoints Governors-General for three Pacific Island states, albeit acting on advice, and did so in Fiji until that country became a Republic in October 1987. All four countries have witnessed constitutional crises in which the Governor-General has played a critical role. This paper examines those crises, and other occasions that have tested the link with the Crown. It argues that the common minimalist defence of such institutions (influenced by one reading of Walter Bagehot's well-known views) – i.e. that such arrangements tend to work better than republican or presidential alternatives by elevating a relatively disinterested arbiter to broker political transitions – misses the fact that realm territories have tended to face similar and comparable difficulties to those Pacific nations that abandoned the link with the British Crown at independence, and that these issues have been no better or no worse handled by Governors-General than by locally selected Heads of State.     

The twists and turns of institutional innovation in small island developing states: the case of Tuvalu

The question of institutional reform in small island developing states (SIDS) has so far attracted two general perspectives. The predominant approach prescribes neo-Weberian principles such as de-politicisation, neutrality, ‘professionalism', continuity and anonymity, and rational-bureaucratic structures. Critics highlight contextual specificities and maintain that Weberian principles are not plausible amid key constraints in SIDS including low human and logistical capacity, pervasive inter-personal and cross-cutting relations, and difficulty in attaining anonymity in public affairs. This debate remains largely intuitive, without the requisite empirical insights about the peculiar institutional trajectories and incentive structures driving change and continuity within SIDS. This paper provides a critical examination of the enduring quagmire of institutional development in SIDS based on a comprehensive account of the experience of Tuvalu.