Capture the flag: local factionalism as electoral mobilization in dominant party Uganda

ABSTRACT

This article addresses a question relevant to many non-democratic regimes: how can a successful dominant party be an institutionally weak one? President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) have dominated Ugandan politics since coming to power in 1986. However, the NRM does not possess many of the institutional endowments that other dominant parties use to control mass and elite politics, such as central control of candidate selection, autonomous mobilizing structures, or dispensation of sufficient political finance to its candidates. Instead, the party secretariat has no real institutional power independent of the personalist Museveni regime, and its local branches house fierce internal competition each election in which most incumbents lose office. This article argues that the NRM mobilizes so well for Museveni despite its institutional deficits due to the precise nature of the competitive process its local elites go through to win its nomination (or “flag”) and the subsequent general election. This process sees self-organized and self-financed candidates and their factions rejuvenate the party and mobilize votes for the concurrent presidential election as a by-product of their competition with one another. The article makes this argument with qualitative data from three districts gathered during the 2016 elections.     

Uganda in Regional and International Peacekeeping Operations

Since attaining independence in 1962, Uganda has only seriously contributed to regional and international peacekeeping on two occasions—in Liberia and Somalia. Due to the internal political upheavals that rocked the country in the 1960s through 1980s, Uganda’s capacity to engage in international peacekeeping was seriously curtailed. As a result of engaging in the Liberia and Somalia peace operations, the country has built capacity to engage in peacekeeping. However, recently Uganda has used its participation in peacekeeping missions, especially that in Somalia, as a leverage to fend-off criticisms for its involvement in conflicts in the Great Lakes region.     

President Museveni and the politics of presidential tenure in Uganda

There are various reasons why President Museveni is so determined to hold on to power in Uganda. These are similar to the ones motivating other African presidents seeking to entrench themselves in office. Museveni believes he is indispensable for Uganda's stability and prosperity, especially in a country devastated by bad leadership in earlier post-independence decades. Moreover, Museveni and his close allies are fearful of being prosecuted under a new president for alleged wrongdoings.

Opposition to Museveni's continued stay in power has come from within the ruling party, as well as other parties and the Buganda kingdom. But, as elsewhere in Africa, the opposition is too weakly developed to challenge Museveni effectively. Also, presidential manipulations, election rigging, and coercive measures have helped to secure Museveni's grip on power. In particular, Museveni has used the military to entrench himself in office.

Moreover, as in some African countries, international pressures to force Museveni to relinquish power are limited. In fact, donors have propped up a quasi-authoritarian regime with large amounts of resources. Museveni has overseen a prolonged period of economic and political stability and donors argue he deserves their support, even when his record on democracy and good governance is tainted.

In Africa, presidential incumbents who have stepped down have done so because of the strength of domestic and international pressures. Where political opposition is organised and united or where international donors use their aid to promote greater democratisation, then leaders are more likely to abandon plans to stay in power. It is the absence of such conditions and pressures that are leading to the creation of a life presidency in Uganda.