The Dilemma of Nuclear Disarmament: The Case of North Korea

ABSTRACT

The Hanoi summit between the US and North Korea failed not because of North Korea’s brinkmanship strategy or its miscalculation of the US position on the denuclearisation talks, but because of a fundamental issue: a dilemma of how much to yield in giving up its military capabilities to expedite the lifting of sanctions. The leadership in Pyongyang has concerns about the ‘deliverability’ of its promises to its domestic audience to ensure deterrence capabilities and economic recovery. The two-level game model explains why both sides keep minimising the range of options for the negotiations, increasing the risk that the talks will break down.     

Two-level games,issue politicization and the disarray of Taiwan’s cross-strait policy after the 2000 presidential election

This study aims to illuminate the interactive relationship between domestic politics and external policy in Taiwan’s mainland China policy after the 2000 presidential election. Following the logic of Putnam's two-level games, this paper demonstrates how the newly elected President Chen Shui-bian adopted an ambiguous and evasive approach as well as frequently shifted positions in his dealings with the mainland China issue due to the constraints of his pro-independence constituents and a vigilant, anti-independence Beijing. Employing Knopf's three-to-three games as well as Puchala’s issue politicization, it further shows how Taiwan's opposition parties—the KMT, the PFP, and the NP—as well as Chen's political rivals, took advantage of Chen’s inability to break the Strait impasse by initiating active engagement with Beijing in order to gain political advantages.