Aggressive pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) by major and minor trading powers alike challenges
the conventional wisdom in favor of such pursuit – competitive liberalization. An equally plausible explanation for an active
bilateral and regional trade agreement policy, one which effectively de-emphasizes multilateralism, may be competitive imperialism.
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is one area in which new provisions, going beyond multilateral
rules, are being negotiated and written into FTAs and CUs. Such provisions may yield insights into which characterization
of bilateralism and regionalism – competitive liberalization or competitive imperialism – is more apt.
Rice Distinguished Professor, The University of Kansas, School of Law, Green Hall, 1535 West 15th Street, Lawrence, KS 66045-7577,
USA. Tel. +1-785-8649224. Fax. +1-785-8645054. www.law.ku.edu. J.D., Harvard (1989); M.Sc., Oxford (1986); M.Sc., London School
of Economics (1985); A.B., Duke (1984). Marshall Scholar (1984-86). Member, Council on Foreign Relations, Royal Society for
Asian Affairs, and Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Author, Modern GATT Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2005), International Trade Law: Theory and Practice (2nd ed. 2000, 3rd ed. forthcoming 2007-08), and Trade, Development, and Social Justice (Carolina Academic Press 2003).
I am thankful to my Research Assistant, Mr. David R. Jackson (B.A., George Mason University, 1992; J.D. Class of 2007, University
of Kansas), for his indispensable help on this work. I also am grateful to Dr. Mohammed El Said, University of Central Lancashire
(UCLAN), for his consistent support and friendship, and for what he has taught and continues to teach me about international
trade and intellectual property. 相似文献
With the rapid growth of cross-border competition among currencies, informed observers predict that the new monetary unions are virtually inevitable in many parts of the world. In fact, predictions of such alliances are misleading and almost certainly wrong. Monetary unions necessarily imply a measure of collective action in the issue and management of money. An alliance requires allies—other states with similar preferences and a disposition to act cooperatively. A survey of proposed monetary unions shows that willing partners among sovereign states are just not all that plentiful. Conceivably some governments could be attracted to less demanding forms of monetary alliance, depending on bargaining context. But prospects for many full new monetary unions are dim at best. 相似文献
Is there a ‘constitutional moment’in contemporary Europe? What if anything is the constitution of theEuropean Union; what kind of polity is the Union? The suggestionoffered is that there is a legally constituted order, and that asuitable term to apply to it is a‘commonwealth’, comprising a commonwealthof ‘post-sovereign’ states. Is it a democraticcommonwealth, and can it be? Is there sufficiently ademos or ‘people’ for democracy to be possible?If not democratic, what is it? Monarchy, oligarchy, ordemocracy, or a ‘mixed constitution’? Argued: thereis a mixed constitution containing a reasonableelement of democratic rule. The value of democracy isthen explored in terms of individualistic versusholistic evaluation and instrumental versus intrinsicvalue. Subsidiarity can be considered in a similarlight, suggestively in terms of forms of democracyappropriate to different levels of self-government.The conclusion is that there is no absolute democraticdeficit in the European commonwealth.