Coordination and control in Russia’s foreign policy: travails of Putin’s curators in the near abroad

Abstract

This article seeks to challenge the conception of the Russian state as being centred on Vladimir Putin by looking at the actors implementing Russia’s foreign policy in its near abroad. In particular, it explores the activities of curators (kuratory), a term applied in Russia to describe officials tasked with making things work often bypassing, and sometimes competing with, formal institutions. Following the state transformation framework, the argument put forward in the article is that curation (kuratorstvo), as a practice of coordination and control in Russia’s system of governance, can be seen as a manifestation of fragmentation and internationalisation of Russia’s foreign policy making. The empirical basis for this article is a case study of Russia’s policy towards Abkhazia, which Russia officially recognised as a sovereign state in 2008. This article addresses the involvement of curators in their attempts to exert political influence as an expression of fragmentation as well as emerging institutionalised curation in development assistance as a part of internationalisation.     

Radiological Smuggling and Uncontrolled Territories: The Case Of Georgia

The article focuses on radiological smuggling and its connection with uncontrolled territories, the “grey zones” that have emerged as important conduits for illicit contraband, including the trafficking of radioactive materials. The presence of “grey zones,” together with poor border security, weak law enforcement and corruption in government structures, are the most important regional factors that facilitate radiological smuggling. The paper documents the collaboration between criminals, politicians, military and security officers and entrepreneurs in this kind of illicit activity and argues that the fight against radiological smuggling has to shift its focus from technical issues to intelligence gathering and analysis.     

Unrecognized states as a means of coercive diplomacy? Assessing the role of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russia’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus

The scholarship on unrecognized or de facto states has been booming in the recent decades exploring this phenomenon from a variety of perspectives. Yet, as this article illustrates, a crucial accent on the instrumentalization of unrecognized states by regional actors – or, to put it differently, on unrecognized states as a source of coercive diplomacy – has been neglected. This article seeks to fill that gap by offering an empirical analysis of Russia’s instrumentalization of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as unrecognized states as a means of putting effective pressure on the Government in Tbilisi – usually with respect to issues unrelated to the unrecognized states themselves. More specifically, this article shows that Moscow has used three instruments (military deployment, passportization of residents of the unrecognized states and responsibility to protect).     

Biting the hand that feeds them? Abkhazia–Russia client–patron relations

ABSTRACT

The article discusses the post-Soviet de facto state of Abkhazia, and its relationship to its main patron, Russia. All patron–client nexuses are marked by a high degree of asymmetrical power – especially with de facto states, which depend upon the patron for their very survival. Thus, it is surprising to see how de facto client states repeatedly show that they are both willing and able to defy the wishes of their patrons and pursue their own agendas instead. Moreover, the patron may be willing to tolerate such rebelliousness. What can explain such “disobedient” behavior? I examine three contentious aspects of Russian–Abkhazian relations: the process leading up to the signing of an extended bilateral agreement in 2014; the tussles over how to fight crime in Abkhazia; and acrimony over Abkhazia’s reluctance to allow Russians to buy property in their country, despite massive pressure from Russian authorities.     

Russia and South Ossetia: conferring statehood or creeping annexation?

Abstract

Events in Ukraine have distracted international attention from the ongoing Russian involvement in the unresolved conflicts of the South Caucasus. This article explores the intensification of relations between South Ossetia and Moscow, focusing on the extent to which South Ossetia exists as a functioning state entity. Are the authorities in Tskhinvali able to provide vital services such as defence and control over ‘state’ borders and territory without Russian involvement? What has been happening in South Ossetia is important, despite being overshadowed by events in Ukraine, as it is indicative of what may well occur in eastern Ukraine: a simmering separatist conflict that is far more than a domestic territorial dispute, with both regional and international implications.     

The Religious Dimension of Post-Communist “Ethnic” Conflict

1 This paper is a result of the ongoing research project, “Transnational Politics in the Black Sea Rim: Religions, States, and Minorities” (April 2009–March 2012) financed by the Japan Ministry of Education. The draft of this paper was presented at the international conference, “The Modernization of Russia and Eurasia: Challenges and Opportunities,” held at National Chengchi University (Taipei) 13–14 November 2010. View all notesThe collapse of socialist regimes resulted in tremendous regional realignments in the regions surrounding the heartland of Eurasia. Remarkably, not only states, but also transnational actors have played significant roles in this process. This study highlights transnational ethnicities (Mingrelians, Armenians, and Muslims) in Abkhazia, and tries to describe how the involvement of transnational religious organizations (such as the Armenian Apostolic Church and Turkey's Diyanet) affected the politics around these minorities. In the Black Sea rim, interstate and transnational politics are rather autonomous from each other. For example, when scores of powerful countries, such as the United States and European Union member states, desperately tried to ignore Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regarding it as a lawless act, Turkey's Diyanet admitted that Russia's recognition of Abkhazia created a new legal situation and began to fulfill its long-dreamed-of desire to help the Abkhazian Muslims. According to political conjuncture in Abkhazia, the same Gali population changes from Georgians to Mingrelians and back. This demonstrates how ethnic categories are used in a constructivist way in the Black Sea rim.     

The architecture of annexation? Russia’s bilateral agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia

Following the August War of 2008, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Both territories remain dependent upon Moscow for their security and economic survival, and they remain dominated militarily, economically, and even politically by their northern patron. These relationships are structured, in part, by a series of bilateral agreements signed since September 2008, which have created a comprehensive legal architecture which, in turn, deeply affects the state- and nation-building processes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This article examines 78 agreements signed between Russia and these territories between 2008 and 2015 in order to better understand these processes and how they interact with and are influenced by their respective relationships with the Russian Federation. It groups these agreements into three categories: the 2008 “friendship” agreements which created the initial baseline for the bilateral relationship; the numerous, more narrowly defined documents which fleshed-out this relationship; and the “alliance” and “integration” agreements signed with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively, through which Moscow sought to take its relations with these territories to a qualitatively new level. Of particular focus is the degree to which these territories exhibited signs of independent agency and formal autonomy, as well as the differences between them.     

Wounds that won't heal: cartographic anxieties and the quest for territorial integrity in Georgia

This paper examines the role of territorial integrity narratives in the Republic of Georgia, which currently features two separatist territories – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – which are de facto independent and have begun to receive limited international recognition. Political rhetoric is further buttressed by various government policies and practices that help transmit the message of territorial integrity to the Georgian public. Cartographic anxieties, or the preoccupation and fear of a country's loss of territory, is a central feature of Georgian nationalist discourse. Referring to the loss of territory as amputation exemplifies the cartographic anxieties displayed in Georgia. Specifically, I will focus on the role of political discourse, maps, patriotic youth camps and billboards and other elements of the landscape, documenting how they help to reproduce the discourse of territorial integrity. It is precisely these discourses and practices that reproduce territorial integrity narratives and construct the entire Georgian territory (including Abkhazia and South Ossetia) as integral to Georgian national identity, enabling the separatist regions to be understood as wounds that won't heal.     

Securing disenfranchisement through violence and isolation: the case of Georgians/Mingrelians in the district of Gali

This article explores the functions of the high levels of violence, insecurity and isolation that have characterised the Gali district of Abkhazia since the end of the 1992–1993 Abkhaz War. It traces their trajectories in a 20-year timeframe, explaining the demographic and economic peculiarities of the case. It argues that violence and isolation were used to deepen the economic, social and political disenfranchisement of the Georgian/Mingrelian population within Abkhazia, which in turn served wider economic and political goals.     

Language and education laws in multi-ethnic de facto states: the cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria

Even after the conflicts of the early 1990s that brought them to their de facto independence, both Abkhazia and Transnistria remained strongly multi-ethnic. In both territories, no single ethnic group is an absolute majority and Russian is the language that is mostly spoken on the streets of Sukhumi and Tiraspol. Legislators of both entities felt the need to deal with multi-ethnicity and multilingualism, including in their constitutions, in laws related to education, or more directly with specific language laws (1992 law “On languages” in Transnistria; 2007 law “On the state language in Abkhazia”). The protection of linguistic rights that is formally part of the legislation of both territories finds limitations in practice. The language of education has proved to be particularly contentious, in particular for Moldovan/Romanian language schools in Transnistria and Georgian language schools in Abkhazia. Why are language laws in Abkhazia and Transnistria so different, in spite of the fact that they are both post-Soviet, multi-ethnic territories that became de facto independent in the early 1990s? The different approaches found in Abkhazia and Transnistria represent remarkable examples of language legislation as a tool for nation-building in ethnically heterogeneous territories.