Sectoral linkages at the beginning of the 21st century: The role of Polish economy in global production structures

This paper provides a first attempt in analyzing the role of Polish economy in the production structure of the global economy in the early years of the 21st century. For the purpose of this analysis, we propose a new approach in which two most important aspects of interindustry linkages in a global input-output model are examined. Contrary to previous studies focused on output-oriented key sector analyses in post-communist CEE economies, we focus on a fundamental policy target variable – income per gross output. In order to analyze the issues in question in a dynamic framework, the empirical results are based on the 2000 and 2014 global intercountry input-output tables for the 28 EU countries as well as 15 other major countries in the world.     

Do FDI patterns differ between manufacturing and service sector in CEE countries

In the paper, we presented results of the research, realized with the goal to test main determinants influencing on FDI stock in manufacturing and services in transitional countries, precisely CEE countries. Some of the conceptual issues identified under possible differences of FDI determinants in manufacturing and services we started with were： （1） What are the most important determinants of FDI in manufacturing and services？ （2） Are there significant differences between the main influencing determinants/factors between manufacturing and services？ （3） Are there significant differences between FDI determinants for developing countries/transitional countries and industrial countries？ （4） What are the implications for policies and strategies to attract FDI in different industries for developing countries？ Dependent variable used in this paper is the FDI stock p/c （NACE 1-digit） into manufacturing and service sector for each observed CEE country, in the period 1999-2006. In case of our sample countries, a set of possible FDI determinants was selected from the pool of traditional and institutional-related determinants in the literature, and relevant indicators available. Empirical analysis was conducted by the regression assessment of panel data, using the set of data for CEE countries, studied over eight years. We estimated fixed effects model and OLS with panel-corrected standard errors （PCSEs） using Prais-Winsten to take into account the AR（1） process. Two out of four traditional variables showed differences between the manufacturing and service sector： （a） Inflation, as the indicator of macroeconomic instability, was not statistically significant for manufacturing sector but it was significant for service sector; （b） wages had statistically significant influences on the FDI in manufacturing sector, but had no influence on service sector. Looking at the results of testing indicators we had found significant differences between all indicators： （a） Privatization influenced on FDI attractions in manufacturing sector and it was significant for service sector, with negative influence; （b） wages had statistically significant influences on the FDI in manufacturing sector, but had no influence on service sector; and finally （c） other two traditional variables-market size indicated through GDP p/c and openness of economy had the same results for both, manufacturing and service sector.     

Continuity and change in Russia's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the so-called ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers' rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO's security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region.However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region. Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders.Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO's security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia's ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.     

The inflow of highly skilled workers into Hungary: a by-product of FDI

The paper examines the flow of highly skilled workers employed by foreign companies in Hungary. It explores the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and tacit knowledge flows through the mobility of highly qualified workers in this age of globalisation. The paper shows that mobility is a very important factor in the transfer of knowledge linked to the movement of capital—to FDI. The paper analyses the potential transfer of knowledge and skills from advanced market economies to Hungarian companies as accompanying FDI. The analysis is based on a pioneering survey on business-led mobility.

The backlash against civil society in the wake of the Long War on Terror

The enthusiasm for civil society that emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the spread of democratic regimes has been replaced in recent years by a backlash against civil society on many levels and fronts. This has particularly intensified since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing global war on terror. This article examines the causes of this backlash within the context of the ‘Long War on Terror’, describes the overt and implicit manifestations of the backlash, and reflects upon the implications for the future. It considers how the growing prominence of concerns about security and the concomitant expansion of counter-terrorist measures across the world threaten the spaces for civil society to flourish and act. It argues that while the manifestations of the backlash, such as the crackdown on NGOs in Russia and the taming of NGOs by bilateral and multilateral agencies, may appear to be disparate, unconnected phenomena, on closer inspection it is clear that they are intricately intertwined.     

Political instability and economic growth: Evidence from two decades of transition in CEE

This paper examines the nexus between political instability and economic growth in 10 CEE countries in transition in the period 1990–2009. Our results support the contention that political instability defined as a propensity for government change had a negative impact on growth. On the other hand, there was no causality in the opposite direction. A sensitivity analysis based on the application of a few hundred different variants of the initial econometric model confirmed the abovementioned findings only in the case where major government changes were applied to the definition of political instability.     

Sectoral dimensions of Poland's investment development path revisited

The purpose of the present paper is to determine the changes of the sector and industry structure of FDI and to confront the observed patterns with the hypotheses or predictions derived from the IDP model. At the heart of the IDP model lies the concept of net outward investment (NOI). The NOI position (NOIP), broken down by the main sectors and component industries of the Polish economy, is analyzed for the period of 1996–2016. We develop a conceptual framework of the sectoral shifts in the composition of NOIP along its different stages. Subsequently, our panel regression analysis indicates that the relative share of a sector in inward and outward FDI stocks is positively related to its level of technological intensity and its level of service intensity.     

Learning from Latvia: Adoption,Adaptation, and Evidence-Based Justice Reform

Justice reform through legal technical assistance has emerged since the 1990s as a means to support developing and transition countries to reform governance structures. To date, few studies have examined which aspects of capacity development can best support the adoption, adaptation and local acceptability of international norms within local justice systems. This paper presents the findings of a mixed methods study of 14 Latvian participants involved in a Canadian justice reform project that established the Latvian State Probation Service (SPS). It provides empirical support for the view that development actors must support organizational policies that build the individual capacity required to engage in the reform process.     

Industrial restructuring in CEE regions: determinants of regional growth in the accession and in the crisis period

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, intense processes of industrial reconversion occurred in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Adopting a territorial perspective, the aim of this paper is to assess the impact of industrial restructuring on the economic growth of CEE regions, classified according to the typology of the industrial reconversion that occurred. Results point out that those areas able to reconvert their productive specialization to both new sectors and higher value functions achieved the best economic performance. These findings provide interesting insights on the past mechanisms of growth in CEE countries and they convey relevant policy implications for their future industrial strategies.     

中东欧的民粹主义基础及其影响——兼论中国与中东欧国家关系

中东欧民粹政党有大量社会底层支持者,农民是最有代表性的民粹主义基础。从历史制度主义的视角看,以农民为代表的中东欧民粹支持者与历史上保守势力的支持基础有类似的逻辑。在农业仍为关键产业的中东欧国家,当传统经济受到转型后突如其来的外部经济影响时,既有经济结构和生产关系受到严峻挑战,在本土保守势力的推动下,竞争力不足的中东欧国家呼吁保护传统经济,反对以西欧为代表的新自由主义的价值腐化、以威权整肃国内腐败、强调历史上的民族荣光、复兴宗教及家庭伦理等。这一思潮被民粹政党用以获取政治权力。在外部经济压力下,农民、城市底层民众、经济民族主义者、保守的政治精英、大文化中心论者共同构成支持民粹主义的基础,民粹政党的兴起是精英和大众共同推动的结果。中东欧民粹政党自该地区转型后就出现在政治舞台,其影响深度和广度是欧洲其他地区所不及的。有鉴于此,探索一条以民粹主义基础为导向的策略路径,整合政府、企业和民间机构三类实践主体,有助于强化中国在中东欧的影响力。积极推进民粹政党或执政党的对华合作,是中国强化和拓展中东欧地区利益的重要方向。