Strategic voting,information, and ethnicity in emerging democracies: Evidence from Kenya

This paper explores the conditions under which voters in emerging democracies support non-viable candidates. We argue that cognitive biases and the geographic clustering of minor-party supporters in ethno-political enclaves lead to misperceptions about the electoral prospects of minor-party candidates, weakening strategic defections both among co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic supporters. We explore these arguments using original survey data from Kenya's 2007 presidential election, a contest that featured a minor-party candidate, Kalonzo Musyoka, who stood little chance of electoral victory. Despite this, results show that most of his supporters chose to vote for the candidate, failing to perceive that he was not a viable contender. The findings suggest that theories of political behavior in multi-ethnic settings can be enriched by drawing upon insights from the political psychology literature on belief formation.     

The Management of Democratic Elections in Africa (MDEA) programme at the university of South Africa: Is this the right path towards African solutions?

There have been a number of initiatives in Africa to rid the Continent of political instability, conflict, poverty and disease. Many have argued that aid from the West has helped Africa in many ways—from stopping wars, to food relief and rescuing the African environment. Yet others have slated Western involvement which they contend, frequently leaves Africans dependant rather than capable of solving their own problems. In line with the pan-Africanist and the African Union (AU) ideals, there is now a realisation by Africans that there is a need to find African solutions to African challenges and problems. This review article explores the University of South Africa’s (Unisa’s) Management of Democratic Elections in Africa (MDEA) programme, by looking at its objectives and the reason why it must be labelled a Programme, its mandate, which is in line with the brief of the AU and pan-Africanist ideals. The article focuses on how Unisa’s programme responds to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG); and how it has attempted to facilitate knowledge for peace in Africa, through empowering electoral officials from various African states. The article concludes by looking at the successes and limitations of the Programme over a five-year period, from its inception in 2011.     

Soviet legacies,organized crime,and economic gangsterism: Russia, 1995–2010

In countries like Russia, where legal institutions providing political accountability and protection of property rights are weak, some elite actors accept the use of violence as a tool in political and economic competition. The intensity of this violent exposure may vary depending on the position the province had had in the Soviet administrative hierarchy. The higher the province's position before 1991, the greater the intensity of business violence one is likely to observe there in post-communist times, because the Soviet collapse left a more gaping power vacuum and lack of working informal rules in regions with limited presence of traditional criminal organizations. Post-Soviet entrepreneurs also often find it worthwhile to run for office or financially back certain candidates in order to secure a privileged status and the ability to interpret the law in their favor. Businessmen-candidates themselves and their financial backers behind the scenes may become exposed to competitive pressures resulting in violence during election years, because their competitors may find it hard to secure their position in power through the existing legal or informal non-violent means. To test whether Soviet legacies and Provincial elections indeed cause spikes in commerce-motivated violence, this project relies on an original dataset of more than 6000 attacks involving business interests in 74 regions of Russia, in 1991–2010. The results show that only legislative elections cause increases in violence while there is no firm evidence that executive polls have a similar effect.     

The territoriality of personalization: New avenues for decentralized personalization in multi-level Western Europe

In light of the increasing scholarly attention to the concept of decentralized personalization, this paper argues that the territoriality (the level of government to which an MP belongs) of an MP would also lead to variations in that MP’s incentive to personalize their campaigns. Using data from the PARTIREP Comparative MP survey, this paper tests the role of the territoriality of an MP in their incentive to personalize their campaigns across nine multi-level countries in Western Europe. Although the level of personalization of campaigns does differ according to territoriality, the underlying explanatory variables do not behave uniformly across territoriality. This paper thus draws attention to the rarely explored role of territory, and the complications it may bring to the explanation of the personalization of politics.     

Why do Indonesian politicians promote shari’a laws? An analytic framework for Muslim-majority democracies

Taking the discussion in the existing literature on the adoption of shari’a laws in democratising Muslim-majority countries as a starting point, we posit that there are two broad motivations for democratically-elected politicians to adopt shari’a laws and regulations: ideological conviction on the one hand and response to the expressed or perceived preference of constituents on the other hand. The ‘demand side’ can be further divided into the preferences of individual voters, and the interests of groups which act as power brokers, influencing the voting choices of individual citizens. These groups may be economic, religious, or other actors. These motivations are not mutually exclusive; the passage of a given shari’a regulation may fulfil two or all three of them simultaneously. However, we posit that the interaction between the place, timing, and content of shari’a laws passed in a nation as a whole will vary in various predictable ways, according to the dominant motivations. The dominant motivation may also affect the vigour with which the law is implemented.     

Preventive action and conflict mitigation in Nigeria’s 2015 elections

Prior to the 2015 Nigerian general elections, there were concerns that the fierce political contest would lead to electoral violence in the country. However, the elections were conducted peacefully, with fewer disputes and election-related deaths than previous elections. This study accounts for the fall in the level of electoral violence in Nigeria and discusses the lessons that Nigeria’s experience presents. It argues that the avoidance of destructive electoral disputes in Nigeria was the result of preventive action taken by the country’s electoral commission, civil society groups, and development partners. The specific preventive actions taken include innovations in election administration aimed at enhancing electoral transparency and credibility, election security measures such as early warning and peace messaging, and preventive diplomacy urging the main candidates and the political elite to embrace peace. The key lesson that can be drawn from Nigeria’s experience is that a well thought out conflict prevention strategy should be an integral part of electoral governance, especially in countries with a high risk of electoral violence.     

Reverse coattail effects in undemocratic elections: an analysis of Russian locomotives

This article argues that the effectiveness of the tactics ruling parties use to control the electoral arena may depend on the electoral experience of its subordinates. To substantiate this point, the work examines Russia’s “locomotives” – the practice of placing regional governors on the list of the ruling party, United Russia, during national legislative elections. It argues that electoral payoffs also came from select regions without locomotives. Given the move to appointed governors, list exclusion likely indicated gubernatorial vulnerability. As a result, governors left off United Russia’s list may have responded by seeking to demonstrate their electoral utility, and those with longer tenures were more likely to succeed in these efforts. An analysis of the 2007 Duma elections shows that United Russia’s vote share was higher in regions where long-serving governors were left off the list. Since Russia’s appointment system dramatically changed the gubernatorial corps between 2007 and 2011, the article also considers changes in the effects of list placement over time. It finds that the relationship between list exclusion and higher vote shares for United Russia disappears as governors with electoral experience were removed from office.     

Voters’ Knowledge of Their Representatives: The Direct and Conditioned Effects of Parliamentary Work

This article examines factors that influence voters’ knowledge of their representatives, a key element in securing the responsiveness and accountability of parliamentarians. We argue that the parliamentary work of MPs (Members of Parliament) benefits incumbents through increased name recall, and that this relationship is conditional on: the incumbents’ candidacy; the voters’ political competence; and their ideological proximity with their representatives. Combining data on French MPs’ activities with a 2007 CSES post‐election survey enables us to test our hypotheses, while controlling for confounding factors. The empirical analysis demonstrates that some parliamentary activities increase the voters’ capacity to recall the name of their MPs. The latter are therefore incentivised to be responsive to and serve their constituents. However, we also find that voters’ political competence and ideological proximity with their MP alter the relationship between parliamentary work and name recall. This may potentially introduce some biases in the democratic process of accountability.     

Rainfall,population density and voter turnout

We create a dataset linking rainfall amounts to constituency-level election data for Irish general elections over the period 1989–2016. Rainfall is shown to significantly reduce voter turnout. The marginal effect of rainfall on turnout is greater in densely populated constituencies, where a rainy day decreases turnout by as much as three percentage points (or five percent). Using a theoretical framework based on a rational voting model, we propose two possible explanations for this effect. Firstly, if rural voters have higher civic duty than urban voters, they may be immune to rain on election day. Secondly, mode of transport may play a role. Urban voters are more likely to travel on foot or bicycle, whereas rural voters typically travel by car. Therefore, the cost to voting associated with rainfall may be higher in urban areas. Constituency-level data on mode of transport from 1997 to 2016 provides some empirical support for this hypothesis.     

Increased economic salience or blurring of responsibility? Economic voting during the Great Recession

There is a puzzle which emerged following the Eurozone crisis: whereas the salience of the economy suggests an increase in economic voting, the realization that economic policies have become Europeanised may blur the responsibility of national governments, thus decreasing economic perceptions' weight on electoral choices. Do these mechanisms exclude each other? Do they refer to different groups of the electorate? We first examine the longitudinal trends of economic voting from 2002 to 2015 in three bailed out countries, namely Ireland, Portugal and Spain, to see if the economy's salience during the Great Recession increased the relevance of the economic perceptions in these countries. Secondly, making use of a unique media dataset of the last 16 years we test whether exposure to major mainstream newspapers that focus on the EU mitigates economic voting. On average, economic voting increased following the crisis. However, individuals who are more informed about the EU tend to use economic voting to a lesser extent, given they are more aware of the national government's limited room for manoeuvre.